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Litigation provides an opportunity for parties to seek 
legal redress for wrongs, and to define their rights under the 
law.  Litigation also provides a unique forum for the 
presentation of a party’s story or narrative about a 
particular issue or set of facts.2  The current debate 
surrounding the consideration of race and ethnicity in 
higher education admissions policies has largely been 
defined through litigation.
The stories of the parties in higher education 
affirmative action3 litigation are so well known that the 
1 Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law.  B.A., Yale 
College; J.D. Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Peter Spiro,  
Linda McClain,  James Garland, Alafair Burke, and  Earl Campbell for 
their comments, support, and advice during this project.  I would also like 
to thank Gisella Rivadeneira, Christopher Fickes, Serge Thony, and 
Jasinta De La Cruz for their invaluable research assistance.
2 See generally Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 307 (1999) (Souter, J., 
concurring);  Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187 (1997) 
(explaining that trial testimony and evidence tell a story with “descriptive 
richness” creating a narrative that has the power to support conclusions 
and sustain the willingness of the fact finder to draw inferences); Anita F. 
Hill, The Scholarly Legacy of A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.: Voice, 
Storytelling and Narrative, 53 Rutgers L. J. 641, 643-645 (2001) 
(discussing the frequent use of narratives and stories in the law through 
the presentation of witnesses, attorneys arguments, and the official 
narrative of a case presented in judicial opinions); Richard A. Posner, 
Legal Narratology, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 737, 738-39 (1997) (“Stories play a 
big role in the legal process. Plaintiff and defendant in a trial each tell a 
story, which is actually a translation of their “real” story into the 
narrative and rhetorical forms authorized by law, and the jury chooses the 
story that it likes better.”)
3 This article uses the term “affirmative action” to refer to all university 
admissions policies that include the explicit consideration of race, 
ethnicity or national origin as a factor in the admissions process.  The 
term “affirmative action” originated in a 1961 Executive Order issued by 
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average lay person may be able to describe the plaintiff’s 
claims.4  The story of the litigation begins when a Caucasian 
applicant seeks admission to a college or graduate school.5
The Caucasian applicant is denied admission, but is aware 
that the college or graduate school has an affirmative action 
policy under which the school considers race or ethnicity in 
the admissions process.  The Caucasian applicant files suit 
against the university and its officers claiming that the 
university’s consideration of race in its admissions process is 
unconstitutional.  It is the seemingly straightforward 
narrative that has come to define higher education 
affirmative action litigation. 
President John F. Kennedy requiring government contractors to take 
“affirmative action” to prevent discrimination on the basis of “race, creed, 
color, or national origin” in hiring and employment practices. Exec. Order 
No. 10, 925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (1961). This executive order was superceded by a 
1965 Executive Order issued by President Lyndon Johnson that 
established the Office of Federal Contract Compliance.  Executive Order 
11,246 established a nondiscrimination requirement for private firms 
performing work for the federal government, and stated that “[t]he 
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are 
employed, and that employees are treated during their employment, 
without regard to their, race, creed, color, or national origin.”  Lan Cao, 
The Diaspora of Ethnic Economies: Beyond the Pale?, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1521, 1537 (2003); see also William W. Van Alstyn, Affirmative 
Actions, 46 Wayne L. Rev. 1517, 1527-30 & n.10 (2000) (tracing the 
history and evolution of the term “affirmative action”).  
4 There is a distinct contrast between the plaintiff’s narratives in 
affirmative action cases, and the plaintiff’s narratives in earlier 
desegregation cases.  In the school desegregation cases African-American 
plaintiffs file suit to end de jure segregation policies in public schools and 
universities.   See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(African-American plaintiffs seek desegregation of public elementary and 
secondary schools); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 
(1950) (African-American graduate student challenges school policy 
requiring racially segregated facilities);  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 
631 (African-American applicant to University of Texas law school 
challenges state law allowing admission only to Caucasian applicants). 
5 See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411, 2417 (2003) (stating that 
plaintiffs were two white Michigan residents who were denied admission 
to the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science, and the 
Arts) (“Gratz III”);  Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2332 (2003) 
(“Grutter V”) (describing plaintiff Barbara Grutter as a white resident of 
Michigan who applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law 
School, and after being denied admission filed suit claiming the law 
school’s admission policy used race as a predominant factor in violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);  Hopwood v. 
State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Hopwood II”) (describing 
four plaintiffs as white Texas residents denied admission to University of 
Texas law school).
4 NARRATIVE HIGHGROUND [Vol X:pppp
The second narrative in higher education affirmative 
action cases is the narrative of the university defendant.  
The university defendant’s narrative is almost as well 
known as the plaintiff’s narrative.  The university 
defendant’s narrative centers around a defense of 
affirmative action on the basis that racial diversity is a 
compelling governmental interest as required under 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause analysis, 
because racial diversity is integral to the university’s 
educational mission.6  Its narrative attempts to demonstrate 
that racial diversity allows different perspectives to be 
included in classroom discussions, and that producing a 
racially diverse group of graduates provides benefits to the 
state such as professionals that work in underserved 
communities.  The university defendant’s story rarely 
includes a discussion of the university or state’s history of 
racial discrimination, or any connection between the 
university’s current affirmative action program as a remedy 
for the university’s past racial discrimination.
The third narrative of the higher education affirmation 
action lawsuit is not as well known, and has become 
marginalized in both the public and academic debate 
surrounding these cases.  The third narrative is the story of 
minority7 students who are greatly affected by the race-
conscious admissions policies as the direct beneficiaries of 
these policies.8  The minority students’ narrative is 
6 See, e.g., Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 1245 (describing the University of 
Michigan’s defense that race-conscious admissions policies were necessary 
to create diverse student body and a rich educational experience);  Grutter 
V, 123 S.Ct. at 2333-35 (detailing the testimony of the Law School’s 
witness regarding diversity as a justification for the school’s race-
conscious admissions policy);  Hopwood II, 78 F.3d at 941 (stating that the 
University Of Texas Law School defended its affirmative action 
admissions policy by claiming that the goal of the program was to obtain 
educational benefits that flow from a racially diverse student body).
7 This Article uses the term “minority students” to define the class of 
intervenors.  The term “minority” is meant to include African-Americans, 
Native Americans, and Hispanics because these racial and ethnic groups 
are most often designated as the groups aided by the race-conscious 
admissions policies addressed herein.  Although this Article refers to the 
intervenors’ narrative as equivalent to the minority student’s narrative, 
some of the intervenors in these cases include Caucasian students 
interested in preserving race-conscious admissions policies.
8 See Emma Coleman Jones, Litigation Without Representation: The Need 
for Intervention to Affirm Affirmative Action, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. Rev. 31 
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introduced into the litigation through the procedural device 
of intervention, which allows a person or group with an 
interest in the lawsuit to become a party although the 
person or group has not been named as a party by the 
existing litigants.9  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 allows 
either intervention as a matter of right or permissive 
intervention.10  Minority students and public interest 
organizations have sought to intervene to defend affirmative 
action admissions policies in every recent higher education 
affirmative action case. 11  Minority students and public 
interest groups were allowed to intervene in the two recent 
University of Michigan affirmative action cases, Gratz v. 
Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.12
Similar to the university defendant, the minority 
(1979) (stating that minorities have a significant interest in protecting 
affirmative action admissions policies); William Kidder, Affirmative 
Action in Higher Education: Recent Developments in Litigation, 
Admissions, and Diversity Research, 12 La Raza L. J. 173, 174 (“Students 
of color–not university administrators–have the broadest, deepest and 
most urgent interests in preserving affirmative action.”) 
One commentator has suggested that the benefit to minority 
students from affirmative action may have led to the erroneous perception 
that white applicants are being significantly harmed by these policies.  
Goodwin Liu argues that admissions policies that consider race as a factor 
may provide minority applicants with a significantly better chance of 
being admitted, but that there is no basis to infer that the improved 
chances of minority applicants means that white applicants would have a 
better chance of being admitted in the absence of affirmative action , 
because affirmative action may not be the actual cause of the white 
applicant’s rejection.  This “causation fallacy” “erroneously conflates the 
magnitude of affirmative action’s instrumental benefit to minority 
applicants, which is large, with the magnitude of its instrumental cost to 
white applicants, which is small.”  Goodwin Liu, The Causation Fallacy: 
Bakke and The Basic Arithmetic of Selective Admissions, 100 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1045, 1046-49 (2002).
9 7C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 1901 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 2002); 6 Edward J. Brunet, 
MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE–CIVIL § 24.01 (1992).
10 See infra notes 13-14.
11 See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Hopwood I”) 
(affirming district court’s denial of motion to intervene); Johnson v. Board 
of Regents University System of Georgia, 263 F.3d 1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 
2001) (“Johnson II”) (a group of African-American University of Georgia 
students permitted to intervene);  Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. 
Mich. 1998) (denying motion to intervene) (“Gratz I”); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing district court’s denial of 
motion to intervene) (“Grutter II”).
12 See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 396 (holding that minority students and 
public interest groups should be allowed to intervene in the litigation).
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students’ narrative focuses on defending the affirmative 
action policies.  The minority student intervenors often tell a 
story about the value of racial diversity to a university 
community.  However, the minority students’ narrative 
diverges from the university defendant’s in an important 
way.  It often attempts to connect current affirmative action 
policies with the state and/or university’s past and current 
racially discriminatory policies or practices.13
This narrative also serves as an alternative viewpoint 
on the individualized effects of affirmative action admissions 
policies. While the Caucasian plaintiff’s narrative attempts 
to portray individualized harm associated with considering 
race in admissions, the minority student intervenors present 
a narrative of individualized harm associated with 
admissions programs that do not utilize affirmative action.14
This Article will argue that despite intervention in 
higher education affirmative action lawsuits, the minority 
students’ narrative has been marginalized in these cases.  In 
litigation, one party’s narrative gains central importance or 
relevance and becomes reflected in the court’s 
13 See, e.g., Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at 605 (minority students argue that the 
their only interest is preserving affirmative action policies to remedy past 
discrimination and that minority students are in a better position than 
the university to present evidence of recent discrimination); Grutter II, 
188 F.3d at 400 (concluding that the minority students’ argument that the 
University would be less likely to present evidence of past and current 
discrimination was persuasive); Peter Schmidt, Minority Students Win 
Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking Affirmative Action, Chronicle of 
Higher Education, September 3, 1999, at A68 (lawyer representing 
minority student intervenors states “black and other minority students 
will be able to bring into the courtroom the truth about continuing 
inequality and racism and bias in higher education.”).
14 See generally, Benjamin Baez, The Stories We Tell: Law, Race, and 
Affirmative Action from Affirmative Action, Hate Speech, and Tenure 
(2002).  Baez identifies a variety of stories that are told by both parties 
and courts in the course of affirmative action litigation.  Baez argues that 
the stories told surrounding affirmative action demonstrate how the use 
of language perpetuates racial hierarchies and subordination in society.  
Baez identifies the story of the “impartial rule applier” in affirmative 
action cases in which “the neutral, objective, impartial judge [ ] 
mechanically applies the rules of the rational legislature acting in 
accordance with the  will of the people.”  Id. at 107.  Baez also identifies 
the story of the “intentional discriminator” in which judges struggle to 
construct a story about the role of a party’s intention in the 
antidiscrimination law and affirmative action.   See id. at 112-117.  For 
the parties in affirmative action litigation Baez identifies stories of the 
“stigmatized minority,” “innocent white victim,” and of “individual merit.”  
See id. at 116-125.
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decisionmaking.15  In higher education affirmative action 
litigation the dominant narrative has become the narrative 
of the Caucasian plaintiff.  This Article will demonstrate 
that the marginalization of the minority students’ narrative 
is a direct outgrowth of the minority students’ status as 
intervenors, in that intervenors are treated by the court as 
outsiders in the framework of litigation.  Intervention, a 
procedure designed to transform bi-polar litigation into a 
context that affords protection to third parties with 
substantial interests at stake in the litigation, fails as a 
procedural device in these cases.
Part I of this Article will examine and recount the 
recent history of intervenors in higher education affirmative 
action cases from Bakke to the recent Michigan cases, 
Grutter and Gratz.  In all of these cases, at varying levels 
courts have either refused to hear or have marginalized the 
minority students’ narrative.  These cases form three 
different categories based on the court’s recognition or 
adoption of the minority students’ narrative.  The first 
category of cases are those in which the minority students’ 
narrative was completely invisible, because intervention was 
denied.  This category of cases includes Bakke and Hopwood 
v. Texas.  The second category of cases are those in which 
the minority students’ narrative is marginalized.  These 
instances of marginalization occur when minority students 
become intervenors in the case, however their arguments, 
witnesses, and evidence are largely ignored by the courts in 
their decisionmaking process.  This category includes 
Johnson v. University of Georgia, and the two University of 
Michigan affirmative action cases, Gratz and Grutter.  The 
third category of cases are those in which the minority 
students’ narrative is given the full recognition and adopted 
by the court.   Up to this point, intervention has failed to 
produce any cases that would be included in this third 
category in which there is full recognition and incorporation 
of the minority student’s narrative.   
Part II of the Article will examine the failure of 
intervention as a procedural device in higher education 
affirmative action cases.  The relative success or failure of 
intervention as a procedural device in these cases will be 
measured on two levels.  First, intervention will be 
15 See id.
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measured as a procedural device based on the policy 
considerations underlying the intervention procedure.  
Commentators, most notably Abraham Chayes, have noted 
that intervention is one procedural device that is a marker 
of public law litigation.  Public law litigation is litigation in 
which the plaintiff seeks to vindicate their constitutional or 
statutory policies in a way that effects more than the parties 
themselves.  There are many policy reasons underlying 
intervention in public law litigation, such as affirmative 
action cases.  These policy goals include the intervention as 
a means of assisting the court in information gathering, 
judicial economy, and preventing injury to nonparties.  On 
most of these policy levels, intervention fails in higher 
education affirmative action cases.
In the specific context of higher education affirmative 
action cases many commentators have argued that 
intervention is necessary in order to insure that the courts 
hear the voices of minority students.  These commentators 
assume that having the status of an intervenor is a good 
unto itself in that the intervenors have an opportunity to put 
forth their arguments before the court.  However, if as in 
many of the higher education affirmative action cases, the 
intervenors arguments are ignored or not adopted by the 
court, intervention a less effective procedural mechanism.
Part III will argue that the central value of 
intervention sought to be fulfilled by the minority student 
intervenors is the opportunity to present a distinctive 
narrative to both courts and the public, which is not being 
presented by either the plaintiff or university defendants in 
affirmative action cases.  However intervention efforts have 
failed to present a meaningful opportunity for minority 
students to become the central narrative in the continuing 
legal debate surrounding affirmative action.  
Therefore, Part III proposes that in the affirmative 
action debate continuing following the Supreme Court’s 
decisions Grutter and Gratz minority students should 
abandon their efforts at intervention, and instead become 
plaintiffs in lawsuits to challenge current “race neutral” 
admissions standards such as the Law School Admissions 
Test (“LSAT”).  In the alternative, minority students may 
choose to take legislative action through ballot initiatives 
and other measure to replace traditional admissions criteria
and expand the current justifications for race-conscious 
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admissions policies.  Through the procedural positioning of 
themselves as plaintiffs or as the authors of legislative 
reform, minority students will be able to meet their goal of 
recognition of their unique narrative.
Part I:  Intervention in Higher Education 
Affirmative Action Litigation
Intervention is a procedural device intended to enable 
a party or group with a substantial interest in the subject of 
litigation to become a party in the case to protect their 
rights.16  Intervention is often compared to other procedural 
devices in the federal rules that “recognize that a lawsuit is 
often not merely a private fight and will have implications 
on those not named as parties.”17 Although intervention does 
16 See Wright & Miller, supra note 9 at § 1901 (stating that intervention is 
a procedure in which an outsider in a lawsuit becomes a party although 
not named as a party by the exiting litigants);  James Wm. Moore & 
Edward H. Levi, Federal Intervention I. The Right to Intervene and 
Reorganization, 45 Yale L. J. 565 (1936) (describing intervention as a 
procedural device that allows a stranger to the litigation to present a 
claim or defense in a pending action, thus becoming a party in the 
proceeding); Jean M. Radler, When is Intervention as a Matter of Right 
Appropriate Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Civil Rights Actions, 132 A.L.R. Fed 147 (1996) (same).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 was adopted in 1938 in an attempt to 
codify existing practice in federal courts at law and in equity.  WRIGHT & 
MILLER, supra note __ at § 1903.  Originally the rule allowed for 
intervention as a matter of right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) when a 
party had an interest in the litigation that was not adequately 
represented by the parties.  The rule provided a separate category for 
intervention as a matter of right  under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(3) when a 
party had an interest that may adversely affected by the distribution of 
property in the court’s custody.  Id.  A substantial amendment to fed. R. 
Civ. P. 24 occurred in 1966, when these two categories were collapsed into 
a single provision under 24(a)(2) to allow intervention as a matter of right 
when the existing parties fail to adequately represent the intervenor’s 
property interest or other substantial interest.  Id.  The 1966 amendment 
also altered the language of the rule to no longer require that intervenors 
be third parties that would be bound by the court’s judgment under the 
principles of res judicata, instead under the current rule the intervenor 
applicant need only establish that the disposition of the action may “as a 
practical matter impair or impede” the applicant’s ability to protect their 
interests.  Id.
17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 9 at § 1901.  The other procedural 
devices that attempt to protect the interests of third parties not initially 
named in the lawsuit  include FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (compulsory joinder), and 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (class actions).   Id; Moore & Levi, supra note __ at 565-
67 (comparing intervention to joinder in its use as a procedural 
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not create a cause of action, intervenors have rights similar 
to those of parties in the litigation.18  Intervenors may file 
motions, participate in discovery, introduce direct testimony, 
conduct cross-examination and appeal adverse rulings.19  An 
intervenor’s ability to add witnesses and present separate 
and sometime conflicting positions on existing issues in the 
litigation often leads to the litigation becoming more 
complex.20 Due to the increased burden on the court and the 
existing parties as a result of intervention, the rule itself 
and courts interpreting the rule have standards to 
determine when a party should be allowed to intervene in a 
pending action.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides 
for two types of intervention: intervention as a matter of 
right and permissive intervention.21
 Intervention as a matter of right, under FED. R. CIV. 
P. 24(a) is allowed when a federal statute confers a right of 
intervention to the applicant for intervention, or when the 
applicant can demonstrate that they have an interest in the 
subject matter of the transaction, and that their ability to 
protect that interest may be substantially impaired by the 
mechanism for the protection of third party interests).
18See Radler, supra note 16 at 147 ; Carl Tobias, Intervention After 
Webster, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 731, 738-39 (1990).
19 Tobias, Intervention after Webster, supra note 18 at 738-39.
20Gene R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention as a Matter of Right- Toward a 
New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 903 (1980).
21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 states:
(a) Intervention of Right.  Upon timely application anyone shall be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United 
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which 
is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the 
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect 
that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties.
(b) Permissive intervention.  Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United 
States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant’s 
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in 
common.  When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense 
upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state 
governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, 
requirement, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or 
executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be 
permitted to intervene in the action.  In exercising its discretion the court 
shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of rights of the original parties.
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court’s disposition of the case.22  The majority of circuits use 
a four part standard to determine whether a party’s motion 
to intervene as a matter of right under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(a)(2) should be granted: (1) timeliness of the filing of the 
motion, (2) whether the proposed intervenor claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the 
subject of the litigation, (3) whether the disposition of the 
litigation may impair of impede the proposed intervenor’s 
right to protect that interest, and (4) whether the proposed 
intervenor’s interest is adequately represented by the 
existing parties.23  In recent higher education affirmative 
action litigation the applicants for intervention have sought 
to intervene as a matter of right, by demonstrating that they 
had a substantial interest in the university being allowed to 
continue to consider race as a factor in admissions, and that 
their interest were not adequately represented by the 
university defendants.
From Bakke to the most recent Michigan cases, at 
varying levels courts have either refused to hear or have 
marginalized the minority students’ narrative.  These cases 
form three different categories or groups based on the court’s 
recognition or adoption of the minority students’ narrative.  
The first category of cases are those in which the minority 
students’ narrative was completely invisible, because 
intervention was denied.   This category of cases would 
include Bakke and Hopwood v. Texas.  The second category 
of cases are those in which the minority students’ narrative 
is marginalized.  These instances of marginalization occur 
22 See id.
23 See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) 
(describing the standard for a federal court to intervention as a matter of 
right under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2)); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 
288 F.3d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Reid v. Illinois State Board of 
Education, 289 F.3d 1009, 1017 (7th Cir. 2002) (same);  Butler, Fitzgerald 
& Potter v. Sequa, 250 F.3d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Loyd v. 
Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 176 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1999);  Public 
Service Co. of New Hampshire v. Patch, 136 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(same); Standard Heating & Air Conditioning v. Minneapolis, 137 F.3d 
567, 571 (8th Cir. 1998) (same);  Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 
F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997) (same);  Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico 
Counties v. Dep’t of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1996);  Mountain 
Top Condominium Ass’n v. Stabbert, 72 F.3d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(same); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (5th Cir. 1994);  Teague 
v. Baker, 931 F.2d 259, 261 (4th Cir. 1991) (same);  C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, supra note __, § 1907;  Brunet, supra note __, § 24.03.
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when minority students become intervenors in the case, 
however their arguments, witnesses and evidence are 
largely ignored by the courts in their decisionmaking 
process.  This category includes Johnson v. University of 
Georgia, and the two University of Michigan affirmative 
action cases, Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger.  
The third category of cases are those in which the minority 
students’ narrative is given the full recognition and adopted 
by the court.   Up to this point, intervention has failed to 
produce any cases that would be included in this third 
category in which there is full recognition and incorporation 
of the minority student’s narrative. 
Part II.A: Invisible Intervenors– Bakke and Hopwood
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a 
Caucasian applicant, Allen Bakke was denied admission to 
the University of California at Davis Medical School.24
Bakke filed suit against the medical school claiming that the 
medical school’s race-conscious admissions policy violated 
the federal constitution, California’s state constitution, and 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.25   Unlike recent higher 
education affirmative action cases, Bakke filed his lawsuit in 
state court, therefore Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 was not available for 
minority students or public interest groups to seek 
intervention.26  At the trial court level no intervention was 
sought, however, when the case reached the California 
Supreme Court the NAACP Legal Defense Fund requested 
that the case be remanded to the trial court “for a new trial 
with directions to the trial court to permit the real parties in 
interest [minority students] to present evidence on the full 
24 Bakke, 483 U.S. at 276.  The facts of Bakke have received significant 
treatment.  See Liu, supra note __ at 1050-1054 (describing the medical 
school’s admissions policy and Bakke’s qualifications).
25 Bakke, 483 U.S. at 278- 79.
26 See id. at 277 (suit filed in the Superior Court of California).  At the 
time Bakke was filed California did allow intervention entirely at the 
discretion of the trial court, however intervention was not sought at the 
initial trial proceedings in Bakke.  See James, infra note __ at 34, n.11 
(citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 387 (West 1973)).  After Bakke, the 
California legislature amended the state’s intervention rule to conform 
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a).  Id.
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range of issues.”27  The California Supreme Court failed to 
address this request for a remand, and thus neither 
minority students nor public interest groups became 
intervenors in Bakke.28
Hopwood v. Texas29 presents another example of the 
complete invisibility of the minority students’ narrative in 
affirmative action litigation that flows from the denial of a 
motion to intervene.  In Hopwood, a Caucasian applicant to 
the University of Texas law school filed suit against the 
State of Texas, the Board of regents of the Texas State 
University System, and the University of Texas Law school 
claiming that the law school’s admissions procedures that 
considered race as a factor were unconstitutional.30  Two 
groups representing minority students, the Thurgood 
Marshall Legal Society and the Black Pre-Law Association 
sought to intervene in the lawsuit.31
27 Jones, supra note __ at 33, n.11 (citing Petition of NAACP for Leave to 
File as Amicus Curiae on petition for Rehearing).
28 The California Supreme Court’s lack of response to the NAACP’s 
petition was likely due to the procedural posture of the case at the time 
the NAACP sought the equivalent of intervention.  At the trial court level 
the court found in favor of Bakke, holding that the medical school’s 
admissions policy violated the federal constitution, state constitution, and 
Title VI because the admissions policy operated as a racial quota.  Bakke, 
483 U.S. at 279.  The trial court refused to grant the injunctive relief 
sought by Bakke on the basis that the Bakke failed to carry his burden 
that he would have been admitted to the medical school but for the 
existence of the affirmative action program.  Id.  The California Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court’s holding regarding violation of the federal 
constitution, and initially ordered remand for a new trial on the issue of 
whether Bakke would have been admitted to the medical school.  See id.
at 280.  The medical school filed a petition for rehearing that included a 
stipulation that the medical school could not demonstrate that Bakke 
would have been denied admission absent the affirmative action program.  
See id.  After this stipulation was entered the California Supreme Court 
amended its opinion to provide for an entrance of judgment, instead of a 
remand for a trial.  Id.  The NAACP’s request for a remand for a new trial 
in which intervenors could be heard was filed after the medical school’s 
stipulation, thus when the California Supreme Court reconsidered its 
remand due to the stipulation there would no longer be a trial in which 
intervenors could participate as parties.  See James, supra note __ at 33, 
n.9 (explaining that the NAACP’s request for a remand to allow 
intervention came after the medical school’s stipulation, but before the 
Court’s decision on the petition for rehearing).
29 Hopwood I, 21 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1994).
30 Id. at 604.
31 The proposed intervenors sought both intervention as a matter of right 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), and in the alternative, permissive 
intervention.  The Fifth Circuit utilizes the majority standard for 
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The district court denied the motion to intervene and 
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion finding 
that the intervenors failed to establish that the Law School 
would not adequately represent the intervenors’ interests.32
The Fifth Circuit concluded that the proposed intervenors 
failed to demonstrate that the law school would not strongly 
defend its affirmative action policy, or that the intervenors 
had a separate defense for the program based on a past 
discrimination argument.33
Despite the common goals of UT Law School and the 
minority applicants for intervention–to maintain the race-
conscious admissions policy–the minority students 
presented a narrative that was far from identical to that of 
the university. The proposed intervenors argued that they 
had an interest in both maintaining the UT Law School’s 
then existing admissions policy, and also in eliminating 
vestiges of past discrimination.34   The proposed intervenors 
also proffered that race-conscious remedies were necessary 
as a response to the state and university’s past 
discriminatory practices.35  The proposed intervenors further 
claimed that their unique narrative would provide better 
intervention as of right: (1) interest in the subject matter of the litigation, 
(2) that disposition of the action may practically impair or impede the 
movant’s ability to protect that interest, and (3) that the interest is not 
adequately represented by the existing parties.  Id. at 605 (citing Diaz v. 
Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1124 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 878, 91 S.Ct. 118, 27 L.Ed. 2d 115 (1970)).
32 Id.  The Fifth Circuit stated that while the burden for a party to 
demonstrate inadequate representation is generally “minimal,” in cases 
where the party whose representation is at issue is a government agency 
the burden to demonstrate inadequate representation is higher.  Id.
(citing 7C CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 1909 (1986)).  This higher burden is due to the presumption 
that the State represents the interests of all the state citizens.  Id.  This 
presumption of adequate representation when the government is a party 
has been criticized by many courts and commentators.  See Katherine 
Goepp, Presumed Represented:  Analyzing Intervention as of Right When 
the Government is a Party, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 131 (2002) (proposing 
that there should be no presumption of adequate representation when the 
government is a party).
33 See Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at 605; supra note 26.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 605 (“The BPLA and TMLS argue that they have met their 
burden of showing that their interests are different from the State’s . . . 
Moreover, they argue that because of its competing goals, the State is not 
in as good a position to bring in the evidence of present effects of past 
discrimination and current discrimination.”)
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evidence of the past discrimination.36
Part II.B: Marginalized Intervenors: Johnson, Grutter & 
Gratz
In Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University 
System of Georgia, three Caucasian female plaintiffs filed 
suit against the University of Georgia (“UGA”) claiming that 
UGA’s 1999 admissions policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, and Title IX by considering race and gender 
in the admissions process.37  Shortly after the lawsuit was 
filed, a group of African-American UGA students and 
potential applicants represented by the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund were allowed to intervene in the lawsuit.38
The district court granted summary judgment to the 
plaintiffs,  holding  that UGA’s admissions policy violated 
the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI and Title IX, and 
specifically finding that creating diversity was not a 
compelling interest to justify the consideration of race or 
gender in the admissions process.39  On appeal, the Eleventh 
36 Id.
37 Johnson v. Board of Regents University System of Georgia, 263 F.3d 
1234, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Johnson II”); Johnson v. Board of Regents 
University System of Georgia, 106 F.Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2000) 
(“Johnson I”).  UGA’s 1999 admissions policy used a three tiered 
evaluation system.  First, the university compiled an academic index 
based on a applicant’s standardized test scores and high school GPA.  All 
students with AI scores over a certain designation were admitted.  These 
students with an AI score under the automatic admission score, but above 
a minimum AI were reclassified and given a Total Student Index (“TSI”) 
ranking.  Non-Caucasian applicants, including Asian Americans, African-
Americans, Native Americans, Hispanics, and “multi-racial” students 
were awarded .5 additional TSI points.  Male applicants were awarded .25 
points.  The university also offered bonus admissions points for students 
with both parents with no college education, and all Georgia residents.  
All applicants with a TSI score of 4.93 or higher were admitted.  
Applicants with a TSI score between 4.66 and 4.93 were then evaluated by 
“readers’ who admitted students based qualities not evaluated at the 
other stages of the admissions process.  See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1240-
1242; Johnson I, 106 F.Supp. 2d at 1365.
38 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1238.
39 See Johnson I, 106 F.Supp.2d at 1367-1372 (arguing that Justice 
Powell’s opinion in Bakke regarding diversity as a compelling interest is 
not binding precedent, and that post-Bakke affirmative action cases by the 
Supreme Court do not support the view that diversity is a compelling 
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Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to the plaintiffs, but refused to affirm the district 
court’s holding that diversity was not a compelling interest 
that would justify the UGA’s consideration of race as a factor 
in its admissions policy.40  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit 
found that even if creating diversity was a compelling 
interest UGA’s admissions policy was not narrowly tailored 
to meet this goal.41
Both the district court and appellate court in Johnson
largely ignored the arguments of the intervenors.   The 
intervenors agreed with the university defendants that 
diversity was a compelling interest that would allow the 
university to consider race in the admissions process, 
however, the intervenors also contended that the 
consideration of race was necessary to eliminate vestiges of 
past discrimination.  The intervenors argued at summary 
judgment that UGA’s history of de jure and de facto racial 
discrimination was extensive.  For UGA’s first 160 years no 
African-American students were admitted.42  After African-
American students were admitted in 1961, the Office of Civil 
Rights (“OCR”) ordered UGA to submit a desegregation plan 
and adopt affirmative action programs to alleviate vestiges 
of the university’s past discrimination.43
The district court only addressed the university’s 
argument that the admissions policy was justified by the 
university’s desire to create student body diversity.  The 
district court never acknowledged in the factual background 
or legal analysis the university’s history of overt 
discrimination towards African-Americans, and the role of 
affirmative action in alleviating vestiges of past 
interest).
40 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1237 (affirming the district court’s 
determination that UGA’s 1999 admission policy was unconstitutional, 
but not adopting the district court’s conclusion that student body diversity 
is not a compelling interest sufficient to satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis 
applied to government policies that utilize race as a criteria).
41 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1244-1258 (finding that the court need not 
resolve the issue of whether student body diversity is a compelling 
interest because UGA’s system of “mechanically” awarding bonus points 
to all applicants of certain racial and ethnic groups was narrowly tailored 
to meet the diversity goal because applicants were not considered on an 
individualized basis).
42 Id. at 1239.
43 Id.
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discrimination.44
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the 
intervenors’ past discrimination argument directly.  
However, the appellate court acknowledged the intervenors’ 
argument that UGA’s race-conscious admissions policy was 
necessary to ameliorate the vestiges of intentional past 
discrimination, however, the court claimed that the 
intervenors’ sufficiently raise this issue before the district 
court.45  The court acknowledged UGA’s past de jure 
segregation policies, but claimed that the summary 
judgment evidence on this point was insufficient.46  The 
appellate court also claimed that OCR’s 1989 lifting of the 
desegregation order demonstrated that affirmative action 
was no longer necessary to ameliorate vestiges of past 
discrimination.47  Also, the appellate court noted that UGA 
itself disavowed past discrimination as a justification for its 
consideration of race in the admissions process.48
In 1997, Caucasian plaintiffs filed two separate 
lawsuits challenging admissions procedures at the 
University of Michigan College of Literature, Arts and 
Science (“LSA”) and Law School respectively.49  In the law 
school suit, Grutter v. Bollinger, the plaintiff, Barbara 
Grutter, claimed that the law school’s admissions process 
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by 
considering an applicant’s race or ethnicity  in the 
admissions process. 50
A group of forty-one individual minority students, and 
three pro-affirmative action coalitions applied for 
44 See Johnson I, 106 F.Supp. 2d at 1367-70 (analyzing the UGA 
admissions policy only under Bakke and post-Bakke case law regarding 
diversity as a compelling government interest).
45 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (“Intervenors did not advance [the past 
discrimination argument] in any meaningful way at the time of summary 
judgment.”)
46 See id. at 1264 (stating that there was little persuasive evidence in the 
summary judgment record to support the intervenors’ argument that 
“preferential treatment of all non-white applicants” was necessary to 
remedy present effects of past discrimination.)
47 Id. at 1264-65.
48 Id.
49 See Grutter V, 123 S. Ct. at 2332; Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 
811, 813 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
50See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2332 (describing the plaintiff’s claims); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).
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intervention in the Grutter.51  The forty-one individual 
student applicants were divided into three groups.  First, the 
applicants for intervention included twenty-one African-
American, Latino, Caucasian and Asian undergraduates 
from various institutions who asserted that they intended to 
apply to the University of Michigan law school.52  The 
individual applicants also included five African-American 
high school students who intended to apply for admission to 
LSA and the Law School.53  The last group of individual 
applicants included fifteen African-American, Caucasian, 
Latino/a, and Asian graduate students, including twelve 
Law School students.54  Joining the individual intervenor 
applicants were three organizations: United for Equality 
and Affirmative Action, a coalition of the individual 
intervenors, the parents of the minor applicants for 
intervention and other affirmative action supporters;  the 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action By Any Means 
Necessary (“BAMN”), a  political action coalition with 
chapters in California and Michigan; and Law Students for 
Affirmative Action a pro-affirmative action organization 
which organized campus demonstrations in support of 
affirmative action.55
The intervenor applicants sought intervention in 
March 1998.56  The intervenor applicants claimed that they 
should be allowed to intervene as a matter of right under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) because the Law School could not 
adequately represent their interests in the lawsuit.57
Specifically, the applicants argued that the Law School 
would fail to raise several defenses, including the Law 
School’s past discriminatory practices, the continuing use of 
51 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 397 (6th Cor. 1999) (“Grutter II”); 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Intervention at 2, Grutter 
v. Bollinger (E.D. Mich. 1998) (No. 97-75928) (“Grutter I”).
52 See Motion to Intervene, supra note 51, at 2 -3.  The undergraduate 
student intervenors included undergraduates from the University of 
Michigan, University of California at Berkeley, Wayne State University, 
and Diablo Valley Community College.  
53 Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 397
54 Id.
55 Motion to Intervene, supra note 51,at 5
56 Id. at 3.
57 See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Intervene, supra note 51, at 
3.  In the alternative, the proposed intervenors also sought permissive 
intervention as allowed under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b).  Id. at 11.
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racially discriminatory admissions criteria such as the 
LSAT, and that the Law School would not be able to produce 
sufficient evidence related to segregation and resegregation 
of educational institutions.58
The district court initially denied the applicants’ 
motion to intervene as a mater of right.59  The district court 
found, similar to the Fifth Circuit in Hopwood, that the 
applicants for intervention failed to establish that they had 
a different interest from the Law School defendants, and 
that the Law School defendants would not adequately 
represent the applicants’ interest.60  The district court 
concluded that the applicants for intervention had the same 
“ultimate objective” as the Law School defendants, to 
preserve the current admissions policy that takes race and 
ethnicity into consideration.61
Similarly, the district court in Gratz also denied the 
intervenor applicants’ motion to intervene.62  The intervenor 
applicants in Gratz included seventeen African-American 
and Latino/a high school students who intended to or 
already applied to LSA, and one organization, the Citizens 
for Affirmative Action’s Preservation (“CAAP”).63  The 
district court found that the intervenor applicants failed two 
of the requirements for intervention.64  The district court 
concluded that the intervenor applicants lacked a 
substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation, and that 
the applicants failed to demonstrate that the University 
defendants inadequately represented their interests.65
The Sixth Circuit hearing a consolidated appeal on the 
intervenor  applicants’ motions to intervene in both Gratz
and Grutter reversed the district courts’ decisions and held 
58 See Motion to Intervene, supra note 51, at 6.
59 See Grutter I, supra note 50, at 6 (opinion and order denying motion to 
intervene)
60 Id.
61 Id.  The district court assumed, without deciding, that the intervenor 
applicants had a “significant legal interest” in the case and that their 
ability to protect that interest could be impaired by an adverse finding in 
the case.  The district court relied on the Fifth Circuits denial of 
intervention in Hopwood  finding that the circumstances of the two cases 
were “virtually identical.” Id.
62 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 183 F.R.D. 209 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (“Gratz I”).
63 See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 397.
64 See Gratz I, 183 F.R.D. at 210.
65 See Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 397.
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that the intervenor applicants in both cases met the 
requirements for intervention under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24.66
The Sixth Circuit examined the intervenor applicants legal 
interest in the litigation.  The court noted that in the Sixth 
Circuit there is “a rather expansive notion of the interest 
sufficient to invoke intervention of right.”67 Based on this 
broad definition of a substantial legal interest the Sixth 
Circuit panel found that the intervenor applicants’ interest 
in maintaining race and ethnicity as a factor in the 
admissions process was sufficient to meet the intervention 
requirements.68  The court described the intervenor 
applicants’  interest as an interest in preserving the 
numbers of minorities enrolled at LSA and the Law School, 
and in preserving educational opportunity.69  The court 
rejected the Gratz district court’s conclusion that a 
“substantial legal interest” must be a legally enforceable 
right to have the admissions policy construed.70  Instead  the 
court noted that the intervenor applicants “specific interest 
in the subject matter of this case, namely their interest in 
gaining admission to the University” was a direct interest 
more than sufficient to constitute a “substantial legal 
interest” under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a).71
The intervenors in Gratz and Grutter presented a 
unique narrative characterized by three aspects: past 
discrimination, the institutional racism undergirding the 
use of LSAT scores and GPA as admissions criteria, and the 
state’s unitary education system.  The first focus of the 
intervenors’ narrative was their emphasis on the link 
between race-conscious admissions programs and the 
University’s history of overt racial discrimination.72  The 
intervenors claimed that a central justification for the 
current University admissions policies were that the policies 
66 See id.
67 Id. at 398 (quoting Michigan State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 
1245 (6th Cir. 1997)).
68 See id. (explaining that the Gratz court erred in finding that in order for 
the proposed intervenors to have a “significant legal interest” as required 
under FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) the intervenors must have legally 
enforceable right to have the court determine the constitutionality of the 
current admissions policy).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 399.
71 Id.
72 See infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
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serves as a remedy for the past discrimination.73  The 
intervenors argued that the University was unlikely to raise 
this defense because the defense would require the 
university to highlight its discriminatory practice,  possibly 
subjecting the University to liability.74
The intervenors argued that the University of 
Michigan’s affirmative action policy was in direct response 
to civil rights protests to end racial discrimination by the 
university.75  According to the intervenors, African-American 
students at the University of Michigan organized the Black 
Action Movement (“BAM”) in March 1970 to encourage the 
university to increase African-American enrollment.76  As a 
result of a strike organized by BAM the University 
announced that it would attempt to meet the student’s 
demands for increased enrollment through an affirmative 
action program.77  The intervenors also asserted that as a 
result of protests by black students in 1975 and 1987 the 
then president of the University issued a mandate which 
became the framework for the current University 
admissions policies, including the Law School’s 1992 policy.78
At trial, the intervenors also clarified the past 
discrimination aspect of their narrative through offering 
trial testimony.79  The intervenors presented two witnesses 
to testify regarding the history of racial inequality in the 
United States.  Historian John Hope Franklin (“Professor 
Franklin”),  professor emeritus of history at Duke University 
73 Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Intervention, supra note 
__ at 9.
74 See id. at 9
75 See id. at 2.
76 See id.
77 See id.
78 Id.
79 In Grutter, the district court conducted a fifteen day bench trial in 
January and February 2001.  The district court asked the parties to focus 
on three issues: “(1) the extent to which race is a factor in the law school’s 
admissions decision; (2) whether the law school’s consideration of race in 
making admissions decision constitutes a double standard in which 
minority and non-minority students are treated differently; and (3) 
whether the law school may take race into account to ‘level the playing 
field’ between minority and non-minority applicants.”  Grutter v. 
Bollinger, No. 97-75928 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2001) (“Grutter III”), 
available at http://www.bamn.comce/2001/010327-friedman-ruling.pdf.  
The plaintiffs, defendants, and intervenors were allotted thirty hours to 
present their evidence.  The intervenors utilized all of their time and 
presented fifteen witnesses.
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testified about the history of race relations in the United 
States.80  Professor Franklin’s testimony included a wide-
ranging account of racial hostilities and inequality, 
including race riots and Jim Crow segregation.81  Eric Foner, 
a leading history professor also testified about the general 
history of racial oppression and inequality in the United 
States.82
The second aspect of the Grutter intervenors’ 
narrative was the emphasis on what the intervenors argued 
is an inherent racial bias in the use of standardized testing 
and GPA as admissions criteria.83  The intervenors argued 
that the use of LSAT alone, without the consideration of race 
as a factor in admissions would lead to the resegregation of 
most elite institutions of higher education.84  This 
resegregation would occur as a result of the “LSAT gap” that 
exists between the LSAT scores of  minority students and 
white students.85   The intervenors’ expert suggested that 
this gap existed based on cultural bias in the test itself, and 
the experiences of the test takers that influence their test 
taking methods.86  The intervenors concluded that in order to 
fairly evaluate the LSAT scores of an applicant as a criteria 
for admissions the law school must take race into account in 
order to account for the “LSAT gap” which is caused by 
80 United for Equality and Affirmative Action Legal Defense Fund, Grutter 
v. Bollinger, No. 97-75928, Trial Outline, at
http://www.ueaa.net/case.htm#trial.
81 See Tr. Transr. Vol. 7, 17:23-18:4, 18:8-13, 19:19-20:4 (Jan. 24, 2001), 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-
75928), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).  
82 See Tr. Transr. Vol. 10 226:2-22, 244:4-9, 250:21-251:9, 252:21-253:8 
(Feb. 8, 2001), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) 
(No. 97-CV-75928), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 
2325 (2003).  
83 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment and In Opposition to the Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Grutter IV, at 27-36.  
84 Id. at 29, 31.
85 See Tr. Transr. Vol. 11, 140:17-24, 141:8-20, 144:20-24, 145:10-13, 
147:14-17 (Feb. 9, 2001), Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. 
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75928), rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).  David White, Director of Testing for the Public, 
testified regarding the “LSAT gap” that “[w]hen we looked at the minority 
students’ LSAT scores and compared that to all their comparable whites 
from the same school, we found that African Americans had 10 points 
lower LSAT scores on average than the white students from the same 
college with the same grades.”  Id. at Vol. 11, 144:20- 24.
86 Id. at Vol. 11, 155:10- 13.
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racially related factors.87
The final aspect of the Grutter intervenors’ narrative 
was their focus on the unitary nature of the state 
educational system.88  One of the continuous themes in the 
intervenors’ arguments and the testimony offered by them 
at trial was the notion that a state’s higher education 
system must be viewed as a continuation of the elementary 
and secondary school education offered by the state of 
Michigan.89  The intervenors argued that segregation and 
inequality in elementary and secondary education is 
increasing, which is another cause of the continuing gap 
between minorities and whites standardized tests.90  Also, a 
witness the intervenors claimed that the elimination of 
affirmative action in higher education also has a trickle 
down negative impact on elementary and secondary schools, 
increasing inequality and eroding the overall quality of 
public education in the state.91
The district court in Grutter, is the only court during 
the course of the litigation addressed the intervenors’ 
presentation of facts and legal arguments directly.  The 
87 Id. at Vol. 11, 159:23-160:3 (“[Race] should be taken into account in 
evaluating the LSAT scores of the applicant.  An aspect of evaluating the 
information is knowing the LSAT score, and knowing the race of the 
people who took the LSAT is part and parcel of evaluating that part of the 
applicant’s file.”) The intervenors also argued that the grade point 
average of minority students is negatively affected due to a racially hostile 
atmosphere on most elite college campuses.  Professor Walter Allen 
testified that African-American students at predominantly black 
universities do better than their peers at predominantly white 
institutions, and this difference is attributed to the racial hostility 
encountered by African-American students at white institutions.  See id.
at Tr. Transr. Vol. 9, 88:3-17, 93:10-19, 103:12-17 (Feb. 7, 2001), Grutter 
v. Bollinger, 137 F.Supp.2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (No. 97-CV-75928), 
rev’d, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
88 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note 77, at 30-31.
89 Id. at 31.
90 Id. at 30. See Defendant-Intervenors’ Final Brief at 8-16, Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1516) (arguing that the 
nation’s primary and secondary schools remain largely segregated and 
these schools “systematically disadvantage black, Latino/a, and Native 
American students of all social and economic backgrounds.”)
91 Id. at 31.  Eugene Garcia, Dean of the Graduate School of Education at 
the University of California at Berkeley testified that in jurisdictions such 
as California where affirmative action was eliminated at the university 
level, the overall quality of education at the primary and secondary school 
level declined.  Id.
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Grutter district court held that under Bakke creating racial 
diversity was not a compelling interest such that would 
allow the Law School to consider race as a factor in 
admissions in a constitutionally permissible manner.92  After 
a detailed treatment of the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ 
evidence and legal arguments, the district court provided a 
separate analysis of the intervenors’ witnesses and exhibits, 
and their legal arguments.93
The district court summarized the testimony of each of 
the intervenors’ witnesses and presented findings of fact and 
conclusions of law specifically addressing the intervenors’ 
arguments.94  The district court pointed to the GPA and 
LSAT gap between Caucasians and the minority groups 
specified in the Law School’s admissions policy and 
acknowledged that the reasons for the gap were “complex.”95
The court acknowledged that “while one must be cautious in 
making generalization, the evidence at trail clearly indicates 
that much of the GPA gap is due to the fact that 
92 Id. at 49.  The district court also held, in the alternative, that even if 
diversity were a compelling interest the Law School’s admissions policy 
was not narrowly tailored to serve this interest.  See id. at 49-54.  After 
concluding that the Law School’s admissions policy was not narrowly 
tailored, the district court found that the individual defendants were 
entitled to qualified immunity from monetary damages.  See id. at 54.
Also, the court held that the Law School’s policy violated Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, and that the individual defendants could be held 
liable for monetary damages under Title VI.  See id. at 57-58. The district 
court pointed to the policy’s use of the term “critical mass” as a goal for 
the number of minority students that should be enrolled at the Law 
School, and determined that “critical mass” was insufficiently defined to 
meet the requirements for narrow tailoring.  See id. The court also 
determined the law school policy insured the enrollment of a minimum 
percentage of minority students, making the policy indistinguishable from 
a quota.   See id. at 49-50.  The district court also concluded that the 
narrow tailoring criteria was not met due to the policy’s lack of a time 
limit on the use of race.  See id. at 50.  Finally, the district court also 
found that the law School’s admissions policy failed the narrow tailoring 
requirement by failing to provide a sufficient reason for considering race 
only for African-Americans, native Americans, and Hispanics, and that 
the Law School failed to investigate race neutral methods for creating 
diversity in enrollment.  See id. at 51-54.  The court argued that other 
groups beyond the three identified in the admissions policy had been 
subjected to discrimination, “such as Arabs and southern and eastern 
Europeans,” but the law school made no commitment to enroll these 
students in “meaningful numbers.”  Id. at 52.
93 See id. 59-89.
94 See id. at 71-80.
95 Id. at 75.
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disproportionate numbers of Native Americans, African 
Americans, and Hispanics live and go to school in 
impoverished areas of the country.”96  The court reasoned 
that even if you accept the intervenors’ factual assertions, 
the intervenors’ arguments fail as a basis for the law 
School’s admissions policy because the Supreme Court has 
rejected general societal discrimination as a justification for 
“race-conscious decision making.”97
In contrast to the district court’s detailed, although 
disparate, treatment of the intervenors’ evidence and legal 
arguments, the Sixth Circuit largely ignored the 
intervenors. The Sixth Circuit found that diversity was a 
compelling interest in the creation of the Law School’s 
admissions policy.98  The Sixth Circuit never addressed the 
intervenors’ contention that the Law School’s admissions 
policy was justified based on past discrimination.99   The 
Court explained that as a result of their finding that 
diversity is a compelling interest they would not address the 
intervenors’ past discrimination argument.100 Therefore, 
96Id. at 75.  The district court did not accept all of the intervenors’ 
evidence regarding the GPA gap.  The district court harshly criticized the 
expert report of Professor Allen who testified regarding a study he 
conducted which showed that minority students at majority 
undergraduate institutions face racially hostile environments that inhibit 
their ability to succeed academically.  See id. at 65.  The district court 
concluded that the court was unable “to give any weight to Professor 
Allen’s study [of the GPA gap], due to the small number of students who 
participated in the focus groups and surveys and due to the manner in 
which the students were selected.”  Id. at 76.
97 Id. at 83 (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274).  
The district court draws this conclusion without considering the unique 
context of an educational setting.  The recent Supreme Court cases 
dismissing general societal discrimination as a justification for affirmative 
action were in the government contracts and employment contexts, not 
education.  Also, the district court failed to distinguish between race-
conscious policies based on past discrimination, and policies based on 
continuing or present racial disparities.  The intervenors also presented 
evidence of present discrimination specifically in the Michigan public 
education system, through the testimony regarding the ongoing racial 
segregation in secondary and elementary school’s in Michigan.
98  Grutter IV, supra note ___ at 739 (stating that because the court is 
bound by Bakke the Court finds that the Law School has a compelling 
interest in creating a diverse student body).
99 See id.
100 Id. (“Because we hold that the Law School has a compelling interest in 
achieving a diverse student body, we do not address whether the
Intervenors’ proffered interest–an interest in remedying past 
discrimination–is sufficiently compelling for equal protection.”)
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after an offer of substantial trial testimony related to past 
discrimination, this aspect of the intervenors’ narrative was 
neither addressed nor adopted by the University defendants 
or the court. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit’s
opinion that the Law School’s use of race and ethnicity in its 
admissions policy did not violate either the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act.101  The Supreme Court found that while the 
use of race is subject to a strict scrutiny analysis to assure 
its compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment, creating 
diversity in the law school environment is a compelling 
government interest and the Law School’s 1992 policy was 
narrowly tailored to meet this goal.102  The majority opinion 
completely ignores the intervenors and past discrimination 
as an additional alternative justification for the Law 
School’s admission’s policy.103  In the factual and procedural 
history of the case, the majority fails to acknowledge that 
the intervenors applied for intervention and after being 
included in the case present thirty hours of testimony at 
trial.104  There is no mention in the majority opinion of past 
discrimination as an alternative justification for the 
admissions policy.
The likely reason that the majority opinion completely 
ignored the intervenors and their arguments was the Court’s 
framing of the issue before it for consideration.  The Court 
stated that certiorari was granted “to resolve the 
disagreement among the Courts of Appeals on a question of 
national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling 
interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in 
selecting applicants for admission to public universities.”105
Also, in the factual and procedural history of the case the 
Court notes the testimony of Professor Lempert that the 
101 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2347 (2003) (“Grutter VI”).
102 See id. at 2341-42.
103 See id. at 2338-40 (stating that throughout the litigation the Law 
School asserted only one justification for the admissions policy, “obtaining 
the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body.”).
104 See id. at 2331-35.  The intervenors were also denied the opportunity to 
participate in oral argument at the Supreme Court.  
105 Id. at 2335.  Also, the majority opinion in Gratz specifically notes that 
the Court will not address a past discrimination justification for the 
admissions policy because the Law School itself never offered past 
discrimination as a reason for adopting the policy. [add citation]
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Law School’s 1992 admission policy was not intended as a 
remedy to past discrimination, but instead to bring “a 
perspective different from that of members of groups which 
have not been the victims of such discrimination.”106
Part II: The Failure of Intervention as A 
Procedural Device
Intervention has failed as a procedural device in the 
higher education affirmative action cases.  In order to 
measure the success or failure of intervention in a particular 
litigation it is necessary to consider the general policy 
objectives underlying intervention.107  Higher education 
affirmative action cases are a classic example of what has 
been called public law litigation.  As initially described by 
Abraham Chayes, public law litigation is litigation in which 
the plaintiff’s object is the vindication of constitutional or 
statutory policies.108
The traditional conception of adjudication is private 
rights litigation in which private parties seek to settle a 
dispute regarding private rights.109  The defining features of 
106 Id. at 2341.  The majority opinion, while ignoring the intervenors does 
include the arguments and perspectives of other groups, namely the 
arguments of amicus curiae business and military leaders.  The majority 
notes that “major American businesses have made clear that the skills 
needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed 
through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints 
. . .What is more, high-ranking retires officers and civilian leaders of the 
United States military assert that, ‘[b]ased on [their] decades of 
experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps . . . is 
essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide 
national security.”  Id. at 2340. (internal citations omitted) (citing Briefs 
of 3M Corporation, General Motors Corp., and Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al.)  
The majority does not cite the benefits of diversity for minority students 
that are outlined by the intervenors in their briefs before the Court. 
107 See generally, 
108 Abraham Chayes, The Role of The Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 
Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (1976); see also Carl Tobias, Standing to 
Intervene, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 415, 419 (1991) (stating that public law 
litigation is comprised of lawsuits that vindicate social values and affect 
large numbers of people); Cindy Vreeleand, Public Interest Groups, Public 
Law Litigation, and Federal Rule 24(a), 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 279, 279-80 
(1990) (arguing that due to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the passage of legislation creating statutory rights and remedies has 
increased the situations in which courts are called upon to render 
judgment affecting a large number of persons).
109 Chayes, supra note 108 at 1282.
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private law litigation are a bi-polar structure, the dispute 
focuses on an identified set or prior events, the judgment is 
confined to the parties, and the lawsuit is initiated by a 
private party and controlled by the private parties.110  In 
contrast, in public law litigation the bi-polar structure of 
litigation has given way to suit involving multiple parties, 
most notably class action litigation.111   The judges also 
engage in what is known as legislative fact finding, in which 
the judge will attempt to gather evidence about an entire 
system such as a state’s prison system or school system, 
instead of gathering facts that pertain just to the named 
parties in the litigation.112 Also, in public law litigation 
remedies are focused not just on the dispute between the 
parties, but on remedies that are forward looking and effect 
large numbers of people in society, such as desegregation 
orders.113
In public law litigation, public interest groups often 
seek to intervene to advocate and protect the rights of third 
parties that may be affected by the court’s decision that will 
define the contours of a particular statutory or 
constitutional right.114  In a common public law litigation 
110 Id. at 1282-83.
111 See id. at 1291.
112 See id. at 1297 (“In public law litigation, then, factfinding is principally 
concerned with ‘legislative’ rather than the ‘adjudicative’ fact); Tobias, 
supra note __ at 420 (“In institutional reform cases, for example, courts 
may undertake major responsibility for fact-gathering, even appointing 
adjuncts such as special masters, to fulfill what essentially are ‘quasi-
legislative’ or ‘quasi-administrative’ decisional duties.”).
113See id. at 1294 (“The liability determination is not simply a 
pronouncement of the legal consequences of past events, but to some 
extent a prediction of what is likely to be in the future.  And relief is not a 
terminal, compensatory transfer, but an effort to devise a program to 
contain future consequences in a way that accommodates the range of 
interests involved.”); Tobias, supra note ____ at 419-20 (public law 
litigants seek remedies to vindicate rights and interests that are 
“abstract, ideological, collective or public in character”).
114 See Ernest Shaver, Intervention in the Public Interest under Rule 
24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 45 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 
1549, 1558-59 (1988) (public interest groups seek to intervene to defend 
policies or legislation consistent with the group’s objectives);  Carl Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Cornell 
L. Rev. 270 (1989) (arguing that the concept of interest under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 24(a)(2) is important to public interest organization because they 
represent large numbers of people who have interests that may seem 
individually insubstantial or intangible); Vreelend, supra note __ at 283 
(public interest groups intervene to represent outsiders in litigation that 
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scenario, the government may seek to enforce 
administrative regulations against an industrial company 
and the Sierra Club or other environmental group will seek 
to intervene in order to protect the interest of citizens 
interested in protecting the environmental resources of the 
community affected by the alleged Clean Air Act 
violations.115  Due to the special role for intervenors in public 
will have a broad impact beyond the parties to the case). 
115 There are numerous examples of public interest groups  intervening as 
a matter of right per Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a). E.g., U.S. v. City of L.A., 288 F.3d 
391 (9th Cir. 2002)(affirming district courts denial of ACLU’s motion to 
intervene in a consent decree between the United States and the city of 
Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Los Angeles 
Board of Police Commissioners); Clark v. Putnam County, 168 F.3d 458 
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding that the Georgia State Conference of NAACP 
Branches had rebutted the presumption that the named defendants, who 
had the same objectives in the litigation as the NAACP, would adequately 
represent the NAACP’s interests, and remanding for consideration 
whether the NAACP had standing to intervene as defendants, which the 
9th Circuit noted was suggestive but not dispositive in determining the 
intervenor’s interest in the controversy); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295 
(8th Cir. 1996)(allowing the North Star Chapter of the Sierra Club to 
intervene with other like-minded groups as defendants in an action 
seeking to keep various areas in the Voyageurs National Park open to 
snowmobiles); Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825 
(9th Cir. 1996)(holding that the Sierra Club and others forming the 
Oregon Natural Resources Council could not intervene in litigation 
between a timber industry trade group and the United States Department 
of Agriculture).
The courts of appeals have put forth various guideposts for public 
interest groups wishing to intervene as a matter of right. See, e.g., 
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2002)(saying 
that even if the federal government defendant discontinues its opposition 
to a plaintiffs position and does not appeal any court ruling in a plaintiffs 
favor, a private party may still seek intervenor status to take up appeals 
as intervenor-defendants); U.S. v. City of L.A., 288 F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 
2002)(noting that the circuit permits intervention in consent decrees, even 
where the consent decree is finalized prior to judicial approval of the 
intervention, with the understanding that intervention is not retroactive 
and intervenors will only be allowed to participate in post-decree activity); 
Northwest Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 837 (9th Cir. 
1996)(stating in dictum that a public interest group has a better chance of 
successfully intervening if they were involved in the enactment of the law 
or administrative proceeding in question).
It is not only large, well-funded public interest organizations that 
seek intervention, often local community groups also seem intervenor 
status.  See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Ill. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engars., 101 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 1996)(denying a group of residents in 
Bartlett, Ill., permission to intervene as defendants in litigation relating 
to the Corps of Engineers denial of a permit to build a waste disposal 
facility); Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 226 F.3d 467 (6th Cir. 
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law litigation, the policy concerns underlying intervention in 
these suits are clear.  
Four policy reasons are typically given for the 
presence of intervenors in public law litigation: (1) assisting 
the court in information gathering and providing expertise: 
(2) judicial economy; (3) preventing injury to nonparties; and 
(4) adding legitimacy to the court’s decision.  Many 
commentators in examining the role of intervention in public 
law litigation have identified, all or some of these four policy 
consideration.116  Courts have also recognized these four 
policy considerations when deciding whether to allow 
intervention in public law.117
First, many commentators and courts have insisted 
that intervenors provide valuable assistance to the courts in 
public law litigation by providing additional facts and 
expertise needed to make the complex choices and decisions 
inherent in public law litigation.118  Intervention under this 
theory operates as a procedural device for courts to gather 
additional information not provided to them by the parties, 
and receive expert testimony to assist the court in making 
and fair and accurate determination of the factual and legal 
issues.  Under this policy consideration the intervenor is 
2000)(affirming the district courts denial of motion to intervene by the 
Wilderness Association, a group comprising three local environmental 
groups and a local resident).
116 See infra notes 112, 115, and 117 and accompanying text.
117 See supra note 109.
118 See Edward J. Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial 
Resources: The Efficiency of Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 
701 (1977-1978) (“The informational input of intervenors can help the 
court’s factfinding and law determination and thus enrich the quality of 
litigation.”);   James, supra note ___ at 42 (stating that intervention 
expands the information available to a court attempting to decide the 
merits of the lawsuit); Gene R. Shreve, Questioning Intervention of Right–
Toward a New Methodology of Decisionmaking, 74 Nw. U. L. Rev. 894, 
909 (1979-1980) (explaining that courts should consider the opportunity 
intervention provides for the court to gather additional data and evidence 
to make possible a more just or accurate decision);  Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note __ at 443 
(because the court’s decision in public law litigation will have a broad 
impact judges will need “a broad range of expertise, information, and 
perspectives to render the most accurate determinations.”);  Vreeland, 
supra note ___ at 300 (“[Intervention] may promote better decisions by 
ensuring that critical information is available to the court.  The original 
parties will not always produce the information necessary for just and 
accurate results; important information may be disadvantageous to both 
sides, of no concern to either, or too technical to be within their grasp.”).
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similar to an amicus curiae in that they are participating in 
the law suit to assist the court in its decisionmaking.  The 
information gathering policy consideration also 
contemplated that there will be information that the 
intervenors have, which the parties themselves may be 
incapable or uninterested in providing to the court 
themselves.
Intervention as a procedural device to aid the court in 
information gathering failed in the recent affirmative action 
cases.  In Grutter, the district court, Sixth Circuit and 
Supreme Court failed to utilize in any significant way the 
information given to the courts by the intervenors.119  The 
district court was the only court to address the intervenors’ 
evidence directly.120  The district court however, failed to 
incorporate the evidence in the decision making process.121
The district court approached the intervenors’ legal 
arguments and evidence as a completely separate and 
distinct from the original parties’ arguments.122
The district court failed to use the evidence presented 
by the intervenors’ to aid in its determination of what the 
court determined to be the central issues in the case, 
whether diversity is a compelling government interest and 
whether the Law School’s admissions policy was narrowly 
tailored to meet this goal.123  For example, the district court 
concluded that the Law School’s policy was not narrowly 
tailored because the policy failed to explain why the Law 
School singled out African-Americans, Hispanics, and native 
Americans for the policy instead of groups such as Arabs 
and southern and eastern Europeans who had also suffered 
from discrimination.124  The intervenors provided testimony 
that would explain the designation of these groups, by 
pointing out that all three groups disproportionately  reside 
and attend schools in impoverished areas of the United 
States.125  Instead of using the evidence presented by the 
intervenors to aid the court in its decisionmaking, the 
district court in Grutter elected to separate (segregate) the 
119 See supra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 87.
121 See id. and accompanying text.
122 See id.
123 See Grutter III, supra note 10, at 36-54.
124 See id. at 51-53.
125See id. at 75.
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intervenors’ arguments from its central decisionmaking in 
the case.126  The district court’s treatment of the intervenors’ 
arguments signals the court’s failure use the intervenors’ 
information as an integrated part of its decisionmaking 
process.
The most prominent policy reason underlying 
intervention is the need to protect the interest of third 
parties that are not present in the lawsuit.127  Since the 
inception of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 both courts and commentators 
have heralded intervention as an important procedural 
device to ensure that third parties that may be affected by 
the outcome of litigation are allowed to be heard by the 
court.128  In the realm of public law litigation, and specifically 
affirmative action litigation intervention was seen as 
necessary to allow minority students who would be affected 
by the outcome of the litigation an opportunity to be heard 
by the courts.129  Despite this goal that  intervention will give 
an outside party a procedural method to protect their 
interests in the litigation, intervenors remain outsiders in 
the litigation.
This is largely explained by the fact that the trial and 
appellate courts in higher education affirmative action 
cases, even after intervention, have treated the litigation as 
a private litigation bi-polar type enterprise.130  In Johnson, 
Gratz, and Grutter the original parties to the lawsuit, the 
126 See id. at 59.
127 See Kennedy, supra note __, at 334 (intervention as a matter of right 
permitted to protect interest of nonparties); Ernest Shaver, Intervention 
in the Public Interest Under Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 45 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1549, 1570 (1989); Tobias, Public Law 
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note __, at 328-
29 (intervention provides a valuable opportunity for third parties to 
participate in litigation that could adversely affect their interests); Vern 
R. Walker, Note, The Timeliness Threat to Intervention as a Matter of 
Right, 89 Yale L.J. 586, 587 (stating that intervention of right is intended 
to serve the policy goal of minimizing injustice to nonparties).
128 See supra note 121.
129 See infra notes 132-135 and accompanying text.
130 See generally Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, supra note 50, at 327-29.  Tobias argues that the courts’ 
development of the four considerations for intervention as a matter of 
right have adversely affected public interest litigants that seek to 
intervene.  Id. at 327.  Tobias explains that the intervention of right 
standard reflects a “private law” brand of judicial thinking and courts 
continue to apply the intervention rule public law litigation as if it were 
private litigation.  Id. at 328.
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plaintiff and university defendant, constructed the 
framework of the litigation and the courts responded to this 
framework.131  The original parties asked the courts to 
address a single question, whether under the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the university is entitled to use race a 
factor in admissions in order to enhance the diversity of the 
student body at the university, and as a result courts have 
made the diversity justification the central issue in all of 
these cases. 132
The intervenors attempted to broaden the framework 
of the litigation by including additional justifications for the 
race conscious admissions program, namely past 
discrimination and the discriminatory effects of current 
admissions criteria.133  The trial and appellate courts 
essentially rejected the intervenors attempts to add or 
contribute additional information outside of the framework 
set up by the plaintiff and defendant.134  In this way, the 
court reacted to the intervenors’ arguments in the same 
mode of a private rights litigation. 
This attempt by the trial and appellate courts to limit 
the framework or scope of the litigation by ignoring the facts 
and legal arguments presented by the intervenors is a 
displacement of the balance of interests that should be 
considered upon a motion to intervene.  The district court 
considering a motion to intervene should balance the 
interests of the original parties and the court in a 
131 See Johnson I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1367-70 (analyzing UGA admissions 
policy only based on the diversity rationale); Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 
(providing minimal analysis of intervenors’ past discrimination rationale); 
Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 739 (stating that the court would only address the 
issue of whether diversity is a compelling government interest); Grutter V, 
123 S.Ct. at 2334 (addressing only the diversity justification and stating 
that the university never offered past discrimination as a rationale for its 
admissions policy); Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2420, n.9 (refusing to address 
past discrimination rationale because university denied that this was a 
justification for the admissions policy).
132 See id.
133 See Defendant-Intervenors’ Final Brief, supra note 87, at 40-43 
(stating that racial integration of the schools is a compelling state 
interest, and affirmative action is the sole means of continuing racial 
integration at the University of Michigan Law School).
134 See notes 94-101 and the accompanying text; Defendant-Intervenors’ 
Final Brief, supra note 87, at 39 (“The district court never engaged with 
either side of the fundamentality of race—not with the students’ 
arguments about racism and meritocracy and not with their arguments 
for integration, diversity, and progress.”).
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streamlined, less complex litigation with the interest of the 
intervenors in offering additional information and legal 
theories to the court to enhance the court’s ability to make a 
more accurate determination of the legal and factual 
issues.135  However, once the court has decided that the 
interests weigh in favor of allowing intervention, the court 
should seek to utilize intervention as a procedural device, 
and consider the evidence and legal arguments presented by 
the intervenors as a guide and an aid to the court.
The test for intervention as a matter of right under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) requires that the intervenors be able to 
demonstrate that the part on whose side they wish to 
intervene will not adequately represent their interests.136
The requirement that an intervenor must demonstrate 
inadequate representation is often said to be a minimal 
burden, but the proposed intervenor must demonstrate that 
its interest are not identical to that of the existing parties.137
Thus, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) contemplates and demands 
that intervenors will bring a unique perspective to the 
litigation.  Despite this requirement we see courts ignoring 
the unique interests that the intervenors were required to 
have to gain entry to the litigation.  Essentially, the rule 
requires certain criteria for entry to the litigation but once 
inside the litigation the rules and our courts offer no answer 
to the intervenors’ interests and concerns.  This lack of 
symmetry between the entrance requirements and outcome 
may explain why courts have lowered the standard for 
135 See John E. Kennedy, Let’s All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule 
24, 57 Ky. L. J. 329, 334 (1969) (stating that intervention as a matter of 
right is a recognition by the court that the interest of the intervenors and 
absence of any effective outside remedy outweighs the interests of the 
original parties to control their own litigation).
136 See Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 (1972) 
(requiring proposed intervenors to demonstrate that the plaintiff may 
inadequately represent the interests of the proposed intervenors); 
Katharine Goepp, Note, Presumed Represented: Analyzing Intervention as 
of Right when the Government is a Party, 24 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 131, 140 
(discussing the special standard for adequate representation when the 
government is a party).
137 See MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 24.074[4], 24-71 (stating that in order 
to meet the inadequate representation requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) 
the proposed intervenors must show that their interests differ from the 
parties’ interests); Shaver, supra note __ at 1555 (explaining that in order 
to meet the inadequate representation test proposed intervenors must 
show that their interests conflict with the parties’ interest, the parties will 
not vigorously represent their interests).
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intervenors’ to demonstrate that their interest is not 
adequately represented.  Perhaps the lower requirements 
are an acknowledgment by the courts that although 
intervenors are formally allowed into the litigation there 
will be little actual role for them as an influence in the 
Court’s decisionmaking.
A court’s lower requirements for intervention and 
subsequent marginalization of the intervenor perspective is 
apparent in Grutter.  The Sixth Circuit in overturning the 
district court’s denial of the intervenor applicant’s motion to 
intervene points to the relatively low requirements for the 
intervenors to demonstrate that they have a substantial 
interest in the litigation, and that their interest in the 
litigation would not be adequately represented by the 
University defendants.  The court stated: “The proposed 
intervenors must show that they have a substantial interest 
in the subject matter of this litigation.  However, in this 
circuit we subscribe to a ‘rather expansive notion of the 
interest sufficient to invoke intervention of right.  For 
example, an intervenor need not have the same standing 
necessary to initiate a lawsuit.”138  The court clearly 
separates the status and role of the intervenor from those of 
the plaintiff and defendant.
The Court’s clear recognition that intervenors need 
not have the same standing or interests as an actual party 
to the litigation leads to the intervenors being largely 
ignored during the actual decisionmaking.  In Grutter, one 
member of the Sixth Circuit points directly to the 
intervenors’ status as a reason to ignore their interests. 
The Law School’s disavowal is why I do not discuss 
whether the remediation of past discrimination is a 
compelling state interest that could justify the Law 
School’s actions.  Not only must a state interest be 
compelling to satisfy strict scrutiny, but it also must be the 
interest that motivated the classification in the first 
instance.139
The Supreme Court’s position amounts to a demand 
that in the context of Equal Protection analysis, and 
138 Grutter II, 188 F.3d at 398.
139 Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 795, fn. 17 (J. Boggs, dissenting).
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defendant-intervenor’s arguments related to the compelling 
state interest must be endorsed by the defendant.  This 
conflicts with Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) demand that the 
intervenors’ arguments not be adequately represented by 
the party on whose side they seek to intervene.
Another policy goal for intervention is to encourage 
judicial economy by consolidating related issues.140  Similar 
to arguments that favor other joinder devices such as fed. R. 
Civ. P. 19, and the class action rules of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, 
intervention should allow a court to address all of the facts 
and legal arguments surrounding an issue to prevent later 
litigation of related issues.  In the affirmative action cases 
intervention has failed to provide a resolution of the issue 
presented by the intervenors, thus leaving open the 
possibility of further litigation regarding past discrimination 
as a justification for race conscious admissions policy, and 
the alleged discriminatory effects of current admissions 
criteria.  
In Grutter and Gratz the intervenors and district 
courts expended considerable resources in the presentation 
of the intervenors’ unique factual and legal issues.  
However, due to the failure of the appellate court to fully 
address the intervenors arguments those resources were 
wasted.
Finally, intervention has also arguably been said to 
lend legitimacy the decisions of courts by allowing third 
parties input in the process of the litigation.141  In Grutter
and Gratz, at varying levels the decisions of the trial and 
appellate courts were questioned by the intervenors who 
argued that the courts ignored their input.142  In Grutter, the 
140 See James, supra note __, at 42 (stating that intervention allows courts 
to consolidate related issues); Shaver, supra note __, at 1570 (explaining 
that commentators note that intervention assists courts in adjudicating 
disputes more efficiently by combining two or more claims into a single 
action).
141 See Tobias, Standing to Intervene, supra note __ at 444 (“In 
institutional reform, and much additional public law litigation, citizen 
participation in the form of intervention might promote governmental 
accountability for its decisionmaking and could make both the 
governmental decision and the judicial determination more palatable to 
those who must live with them”); Vreeland, supra note ___ at 300 (stating 
that judicial decisions that affect widespread interests may be more likely 
to be viewed as illegitimate if courts fail to give the public a right to be 
heard through intervention).
142 See supra note 87 and accompanying text; Jeremy Berkwoitz, Mich. 
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intervenors questioned the district court’s willingness to 
involve the intervenors in its decisionmaking process 
stating: “The district court never engaged with either side of 
the fundamentality of race—not with the students’ 
arguments about racism and meritocracy and not with their 
arguments for integration, diversity, and progress.”143  The 
presence of the intervenors in the recent affirmative action 
cases has failed to lend legitimacy to the courts’ decisions 
due to the courts’ failure to sufficiently address the 
intervenors’ evidence and legal arguments in the 
decisionmaking in the case.  
In the specific context of affirmative action higher 
education litigation the predominant argument regarding 
intervention has been that minority students have a 
significant vested interest in preserving affirmative action 
admissions programs, and intervention provides the best 
procedural device for minority students to protect their 
interest in affirmative action litigation.144  In an article 
published almost twenty-five years ago, Emma Coleman 
Jones argued that in affirmative action litigation such as
Bakke145 no party in the lawsuit directly represented the 
interests of minority students and applicants.146  Jones 
argued that intervention is the best procedural device for 
correcting the absence of minority representation in higher 
Daily, March 11, 2003 (attorney for Grutter intervenors criticizes Supreme 
Court’s denial of time for intervenors to participate in oral argument 
stating that the Court would be unable to hear crucial evidence regarding 
racial bias and inequality in the admission process).
143 See Defendant-Intervenors’ Final Brief, supra note 87, at 39.
144 See Jones, supra note ___ at 34  (arguing that minority interest groups 
should be granted intervention of right in affirmative action litigation, 
and that intervention has great potential to “safeguard” minority interests
in defending affirmative action programs); Alan Jenkins, Foxes Guarding 
the Chicken Coop: Intervention as of Right and the Defense of Civil Rights 
Remedies, 4 Mich. J. Race & L. 263, 268-69 (1999) (intervention by 
affirmative action beneficiaries is appropriate in most affirmative action 
cases and minority students have the only unencumbered interest in 
defending affirmative action policies); Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views 
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 
Colum. L. Rev. 928, 967-68 (2001) (asserting that the intervenors in the 
Michigan affirmative action cases are an important voice for 
“transformative politics,” the notion that the goal of affirmative action 
should ultimately be ending the subordination of people of color.)
145 Bakke, 98 S.Ct. at 2757.
146 Jones, supra note 8, at 31.
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education affirmative action cases.147  Jones suggests that 
courts are more likely to uphold affirmative action policies if 
intervenors participate in the litigation as a voice for 
“minority-group interests.”148
More recently, other commentators have identified the 
goals of intervention if higher education affirmative action 
litigation.  In a recent article Charles Lawrence states that 
intervenors provide a valuable critique of the “liberal 
defense of affirmative action,” commonly known as the 
“diversity defense.”149 Lawrence argues that diversity has 
become the dominant rationale for affirmative action
programs offered by universities and others attempting to 
preserve affirmative action.150  Lawrence argues that the 
intervenors are attempting to engage in the promotion of 
“transformative politics,” the notion that in the debate over 
affirmative action beyond the winning and losing of a 
particular case is the need to change political consciousness 
and highlight the need for the end of racial inequality.151  He 
says “the intervenors have taken a first step in that the true 
victims’ voices be heard and in subverting the legal fiction 
that only recognizes injury to the white plaintiffs and makes 
the University a defender, never a violator, of minority 
rights.”
The intervenors themselves have also identified the 
roles they seek to play in these cases.  The intervenors view 
the procedural process of intervention in higher education 
affirmative action cases as a  mechanism for promoting the 
end of racial inequality in society and expanding 
147 See id. at 32 (arguing that intervention is one of the procedural devices 
available to correct the absence of minority representation in higher 
education affirmative action cases).
148 Id. at 33.
149 Lawrence, supra note 141, at 931.
150 Id. (“I argue that as diversity has emerged as the dominant defense of 
affirmative action in the university setting, it has pushed other more 
radical substantive defenses to the background.”).
151 See id. at 965-66 (“Transformative politics requires looking beyond winning or 
losing the particular legal dispute or political battle and asking how one’s actions 
serve to reinforce people’s awareness of our interdependence and mutual 
responsibility as members of the human family. . .The task is to help the privileged 
comprehend the profound costs associated with inequality—the public costs of 
prisons, crime, illiteracy, disease, and the violence of an alienated underclass—as 
well as the personal costs of loneliness and anomie in a world where no one is 
responsible for the pain of any other person.”)
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opportunities for minorities in higher education.152   In their 
view, the protection of their interests begins with  voicing 
their unique perspective or story regarding race-conscious 
admissions policies during the course of the litigation.153
As identified by Jones, Lawrence, and the intervenors 
themselves, the goals of minority students and public 
interest groups that seek intervention in these cases are 
two-fold:  interest goals and narrative goals.  The 
intervenors seek to protect their interests, namely 
successfully defending race-conscious admissions policies.154
The intervenors also have a narrative goal to have their 
voices be heard, and in doing so to steer the affirmative 
action admissions debate in courts and in public discourse 
away from diversity and instead to remedying past 
discrimination and racial stratification.155
The recent higher education affirmative action cases 
indicate that intervention is largely failing as a procedural 
device for providing intervenors a method to meet these two 
goals of protecting their interests, and meaningfully convey 
their unique narrative.  First, in some recent higher 
152 Miranda Massie, DET. FREE PRESS, January 17, 2001, (attorney for 
Grutter intervenors stating that “[S]tudent intervenors will give questions 
of racist inequality, bias and unfairness their proper emphasis.  The 
pernicious and stultifying myth of race-neutral meritocracy will finally be 
dispelled.”);  Katie Plona, MICH. DAILY, Feb. 6, 1998, at 1 (attorney for 
Citizens for Affirmative Actions Preservation explaining that the 
intervenors “have a direct and significant interest in preserving an 
admissions policy that broadens access to the University, including the 
University’s authority to consider how a student’s racial background has 
affected his or her experiences.”); Peter Schmidt, Minority Students Win 
Right to Intervene in Lawsuit Attacking Affirmative Action, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 3, 1999, at A68 (lawyer for Gratz and Grutter
intervenors stating that intervention is necessary because “[i]t has been 
activism by students– always–that has been responsible for the expansion 
of opportunity at the University of Michigan . . . it has never been the 
university acting on its own.”).
153  Massie, supra note __ (“ . . .the participation of student intervenors in 
the case gives us a chance for something more.  The trail in the U-M Law 
School case will change the terms of the [affirmative action] debate and 
will correct serious flaws in the approach of recent decisions.” Schmidt, 
supra note __ at A68 (attorney for intervenors stating that intervention 
“means that black and other minority students will be able to bring into 
the courtroom the truth about continuing inequality and racism and bias 
in higher education.”);  
154 See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Brief in Support of Defendants’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 80, at 1-3 (urging court to 
uphold the Law School’s admissions policy).
155 See infra note  and accompanying text.
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education affirmative action cases intervention has failed to 
provide intervenors with a method of protecting their 
interest goal of preserving race-conscious admissions 
programs for the purpose of remedying racial inequalities.
In Hopwood where the Fifth Circuit struck down the 
race-conscious admissions policy, the intervenors were 
denied intervenor status.156  In applying the standard for 
intervention as a matter of right, the district and appellate 
courts wrongly equated the university’s narrative with the 
minority students’ narrative, thus finding that the 
university would adequately represent the proposed 
intervenors’ interests.157  The court viewed the University’s 
narrative simply as a story about the defense of a race-
conscious admissions program, assuming that the 
University will work vigorously not to be found to have 
established and promoted an unconstitutional policy.158 The 
Fifth Circuit’s initial decision to deny intervention in the 
case, was later noted by one judge on the Fifth Circuit as a 
key error in the court’s attempt to render a thoughtful 
decision on the merits of the case itself: “As to the request to 
intervene, what class of persons is more qualified to adduce 
the evidence of the present effects of past discrimination 
than current and prospective black law students?”159
In Johnson and Gratz, although the intervenors are 
present in the case, the courts failed to uphold the race-
conscious admissions policy.160  In both of these cases the 
Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court respectively found, the 
admissions policies unconstitutional without a full 
consideration of the intervenors’ primary contention that the 
race-conscious policies were justified as remedies for past 
discrimination UGA and the University of Michigan.161
156 See notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
157 Hopwood I, 21 F.3d at 606 (“The proposed intervenors have not 
demonstrated that the State will not strongly defend its affirmative action 
program.”)
158 Id.
159 Hopwood v. State of Texas, 84 F.3d 720, 725 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Hopwood 
III”) (Stewart, dissenting).  
160 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1244 (affirming district court’s finding that 
UGA’s race conscious admissions policy was unconstitutional);  Gratz III, 
123 S.Ct. at 2417 (holding that LSA’s admissions policy violated both the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act).
161 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (dismissing in one paragraph the 
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Intervention has also largely failed to allow the 
intervenors’ meaningful opportunity to meet their narrative 
goal to have their voices heard by the courts.  This is evident 
primarily from the fact that in Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz
the courts failed to engage the intervenors’ narrative 
without an endorsement of that narrative by the university 
defendant.162  In this way, the courts essentially demand 
that the intervenors’ narrative be the same as the university 
defendant in order for the court to recognize the narrative as 
one of central relevance or importance.  
 In Grutter and Gratz the intervention fails to provide 
the intervenors with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, 
because the courts insist that the intervenors’ narrative 
mirror the narrative of the university defendant.  In Grutter, 
the University refused to put forth past discrimination as a 
justification for its admissions policy.163  Instead, the Law 
School offered a drastically different vision of the advent of 
its admissions policy.  While the intervenors claimed that 
the framework for the policy arose from campus protests by 
African-American students to encourage “educational 
equality,” the Law School claimed that the admissions policy 
arose solely from the Law School’s commitment to enroll 
students with different perspectives.164
Also, in contrast to the intervenors’ evidence regarding 
past discrimination, the Law School offered no testimony 
intervenors’ past discrimination contention);  Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2420, 
n. 9 (rejecting in a single footnote the intervenors’ argument that LSA’s 
programs had a remedial justification).
162 See Johnson II, 263 F.3d at 1264 (stating that there was little 
persuasive evidence in the record to support a remedial justification, in 
part because UGA rejected the position that its policy was motivated by a 
need to remediate past discrimination); Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2420, n. 9 
(“The District Court considered and rejected respondent-intervenors’ [past 
discrimination] argument . . . We agree, and to the extent respondent-
intervenors reassert this justification, a justification the University has 
never asserted throughout the course of this litigation, we affirm the 
District Court’s disposition of the issue.”)
163 See Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 735 (‘The Law School contends that its 
interest in achieving a diverse student body is compelling . . . [t]he 
Intervenors offer an additional justification for the Law School’s 
consideration of race and ethnicity–remedying past discrimination.”)
164 See Grutter IV, 288 F.3d at 737 (“Professor Richard Lempert, the chair 
of the faculty committee that drafted the admissions policy, explained 
that the Law School’s commitment to such diversity was not intended as a 
remedy for past discrimination, but as a means of including students who 
may bring a different perspective to the Law School.”)
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regarding past racial or ethnic discrimination by the Law 
School or the University of Michigan.165 The Law School 
instead presented evidence focused solely on diversity as a 
justification for affirmative action.166  The Law School 
presented the testimony of current and former University of 
Michigan professors and administrators to testify about the 
pedagogical value of diversity, and the focus of the 
admissions policy to admit a diverse class without the use of 
quotas.167  The Law School also presented detailed testimony 
regarding the 1992 admissions policy at issue in the 
lawsuit.168  The law school also presented an expert witness 
to statistically substantiate the Law School’s claim that no 
quota or numerical goal was used in the admissions 
policy.169
The Law School’s refusal to adopt the intervenors’ 
past discrimination analysis may be explained by several 
factors.  First, the Law School claimed that the faculty 
committee which conceived of the policy, and later the full 
faculty that adopted the admissions policy never considered 
past discrimination as a justification for the admissions 
policy.  Instead, as stated in the policy itself the Law School 
claimed that the policy was solely justified by the Law 
School’s goal “to admit a group of students who individually 
and collectively are among the most capable students 
applying to American law schools in a given year . . . 
Collectively, we seek a mix of students with varying 
backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn 
from each other.”170  The Law School policy also specifically 
indicates an emphasis on racial and ethnic diversity: 
165See Grutter III, supra note 76, at 4-36 (giving detail recount of 
witnesses presented by the Law School, all of whom testified regarding 
admissions procedure or the development of admissions policy to foster a 
diverse student body).
166 See id.
167 See, Trial Outline infra note ___ at 6.  Lee Bollinger, president of the 
University of Michigan in 2001, Professor Richard Lempert of the Law 
School, and then dean of the Law School, Jeffrey Lehman, all  testified on 
behalf of the University as to the diversity justification for the Law 
School’s admissions policy.
168 See id.
169 See Id. at 
170 Grutter III, supra note 76, at 5 (citing Michigan Law School’s 1992 
Admissions Policy at 1).
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There is, however, a commitment to one particular type of 
diversity that the school has long had and which should 
continue.  This is a commitment to racial and ethnic 
diversity with special reference to the inclusion of students 
from groups which have been historically discriminated 
against, like African-Americans, Hispanics and Native 
Americans, who without this commitment might not be 
represented in our student body in meaningful numbers.  
These students are particularly likely to have experiences 
and perspectives of special importance to our mission.171
Based on the text of the 1992 admissions policy itself, 
and the testimony of the Law School administrators and 
faculty that developed the policy there can be little doubt 
that the goal of maintaining racial and ethnic diversity was 
a motivating factor in the development of the 1992 
admissions policy.  However, it is also just as likely that the 
Law School began considering race and ethnicity as a factors 
in its admissions policy as a direct response to both societal 
discrimination and discrimination by the University of 
Michigan itself.  As mentioned in the Law School policy, by 
the time the 1992 admissions policy was developed the Law 
School “over the past two decades” preceding the 1992 policy 
was already making efforts to increase the numbers of 
certain minority groups at the Law School.  The Law 
School’s use of race and ethnicity as a consideration in 
admissions traces back to 1966.172  In 1975, the Law School 
adopted a formal admissions policy stating that the Law 
School should seek to enroll African-Americans, Hispanic 
students, and Native Americans as 10-12% of the entering 
class.  The reason for this numerical goal was stated as “the 
Law School recognizes the racial imbalance now existing in 
the legal profession and the public interest in increasing the 
number of lawyers from ethnic and cultural minorities 
171 Id. at 9 (citing Michigan Law School’s 1992 Admissions Policy at 9).
172 See id. at 13, fn. 8.  The district court referenced a trial exhibit entitled 
“The History of Special Admissions at the University of Michigan Law 
School, 1966-81.”  This document recounts the history of the Law School’s 
efforts to enroll minority students.   In 1966, the law school faculty began 
to give preference to African-American students and students from 
“disadvantaged backgrounds” for admissions off the waiting list due to the 
faculty’s concern about the small numbers of African-American students 
enrolling at the Law School.
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significantly underrepresented in the profession.”173
The Law School’s initial focus on the need to address 
“racial imbalance” in the legal profession is much more 
closely akin to the argument that race conscious admissions 
policies are needed to cure societal discrimination.  Curing 
racial imbalance is not an attempt to improve the classroom 
environment or capitalize on different perspectives that may 
be offered by students of certain racial and ethnic minority 
groups.  Instead, the Law School was attempting to correct 
numerical differences in the number of minorities attending 
the Law School, and joining the legal profession.  This 
original statement of purpose by the Law School resembles 
the intervenors claims that the current consideration of race 
by the Law School is necessary to insure that the law School 
does not become “resegregated.”  In the intervenors’ current 
narrative and the previous incarnations of the Law School’s 
admissions policies, preventing resegregation and ending 
racial imbalance is a goal unto itself, separate from creating 
a racially diverse law school environment.
Therefore, looking at the Law School’s admissions 
policy from a broader perspective demonstrates that 
diversity was not the only justification for the Law School’s 
use of race in its admissions program.  The Law School’s 
abandonment of the past discrimination rationale may be 
explained a number of considerations.  The Law School in its 
litigation strategy may have concluded that a past 
discrimination rationale was unlikely to provide a sufficient 
basis for the courts to find the use of race to meet the 
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.  In affirmative 
action cases over the last quarter century the Supreme 
Court has consistently rejected remedying general societal 
discrimination as a justification for the use of race in 
admissions, hiring, and government contracting.
The courts in Johnson, Grutter, and Gratz failed to 
acknowledge the reason that the university defendant would 
avoid adopting the intervenors’ past discrimination 
narrative, namely because this story implicates the 
university in past and ongoing racial discrimination. 174
173 Id. at 13 (citing University of Michigan Law School’s 1988-89 Law 
School Announcement at 85-86).
174 See Lawrence, supra note 107, at 956 (“Perhaps the University’s 
rejection of the remedial defense can be explained by its concern that by 
admitting its own discriminatory practices it would expose itself to 
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The argument can be made that while the intervenors’ 
narrative was never adopted by any of the courts deciding 
Grutter or Gratz, aspects of the intervenors’ narrative were 
heard, because elements of the narrative are interwoven in 
the Court’s decisions.  Although not attributed to the 
intervenors, Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence in Grutter 
adopts a similar perspective to that of the intervenors’ 
narrative regarding the unitary nature of a state’s 
educational system by highlighting  the place of affirmative 
action in society’ attempt to equalize educational 
opportunity for students of all races in ethnicity.175
Justice Ginsburg argued that the majority’s observation 
that “race-conscious programs” must have a “logical end 
point” will be more of a consideration over the next 
generation as society makes progress towards 
nondiscrimination and “genuinely equal opportunity.”176
Similar to arguments made by the intervenors regarding the 
need for race conscious solutions to remedy continuing racial 
discrimination, Justice Ginsburg notes that currently 
“conscious and unconscious race bias, even rank 
discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, 
impeding realization of our highest values and ideals.”177
Justice Ginsburg also cited statistics that are reflective 
of the unitary education aspect of the intervenors’ narrative.  
Justice Ginsburg recognizes that as of 2000-2001 71.6% of 
African-American children and 76.3% of Hispanic children 
attended a school in which minorities made up a majority of 
the student body, and that “many minority students 
encounter markedly inadequate and unequal educational 
opportunities.”178  Justice Ginsburg only connects her 
evidence regarding segregation and inequality in elementary 
and secondary schools with her argument that the time has 
not yet arrived to sunset affirmative action programs.  Thus, 
while Justice Ginsburg does not acknowledge the 
intervenors narrative related to current discrimination and 
the inequality of educational opportunities as a basis for the 
Law School’s affirmative action, these elements are present 
in her concurrence thus providing some recognition of the 
liability vis-vis minority applicants and students.”
175 See Grutter V, supra note __ at 2347-48 (J. Ginsburg, concurring).
176 Id. (J. Ginsburg, concurring).
177 Id. at 2347.
178 Id.
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intervenors’ perspective.
The intervenors’ narrative theme of the inherent 
unfairness of the use of LSAT scores as a dominant 
admissions criteria also found recognition in the unlikely 
quarter of the dissent of Justice Thomas.179  Justice Thomas 
rejects the majority opinion’s conclusion that the Law 
School’s use of race in admissions leads to educational 
benefits for all students.180  Justice Thomas critiques the 
concept of selective admissions, stating that “there is 
nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally protected 
about ‘selective’ admissions.”181  He argues that law schools 
have known that African-American students perform 
relatively worse on the LSAT than Caucasian students, yet 
the law schools continue to use the test as an admissions 
criteria, and then consider race to “correct for black 
underperformance by using racial discrimination in 
admissions so as to obtain their aesthetic student body.”182
This argument is similar to the one made by the 
intervenors regarding the use of the LSAT and GPA.183  The 
intervenors argued that the use of the LSAT without adding 
the explicit consideration of race, amounts to a racially 
biased admissions system.184  The intervenors also presented 
testimony that attempted to demonstrate that the LSAT is 
racially biased.185  At bottom, much of the intervenors 
questioning of the use of LSAT and GPA is an attack on the 
179 See id. at 2360-61 (“The Law School’s continued adherence to [the 
LSAT] it knows produces racially skewed results is not entitled to 
deference by this Court.”)
180 Id. at 2357.  Ironically, although Justice Thomas’s critique of 
admissions criteria mirrors the intervenors’ arguments, he fails to 
acknowledge the arguments of the intervenors in the portion of his 
opinion in which he argues that affirmative action programs “stamp 
minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop 
dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are ‘entitled’ to 
preferences.”  Id. at 2361.  The intervenors include a minority students 
who, as current students at LSA and the Law School, were “beneficiaries” 
of affirmative action.  None of these students corroborate Justice 
Thomas’s assertion that beneficiaries feel either entitled or inferior due to 
affirmative action programs.  Justice Thomas fails to acknowledge the 
testimony by minority students in Grutter, which dispute his claims of 
stigma related to affirmative action.
181 Id. at 2360.
182Id.
183 See infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
184 See id.
185 See id.
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current system of selective admissions.  The intervenors are 
essentially stating that the current “neutral” selective 
admissions criteria are unable to stand alone without the 
consideration of race.186  Although the intervenors would 
obviously disagree with Justice Thomas’s conclusion that it 
is constitutionally impermissible to consider race in 
admissions, Justice Thomas’s dissent one of the intervenors’ 
narrative strands which questions other aspects of current 
admissions systems beyond the use of race.
Part III: Claiming Narrative Highground : 
Addressing the Failure of Intervention as 
Procedural Device
Intervention has failed as a procedural device in the 
recent affirmative action higher education affirmative action 
cases.187  The general policy goals underlying intervention 
have not been met in these cases, and the benefits of 
intervention said to attach in affirmative action cases have 
failed to materialize.188  Therefore, minority students and 
public interest organizations that have served as intervenors 
in these cases should abandon intervention as a procedural 
device in the continuing legal and public debate surrounding 
higher education admissions policies.
Several important issues in the area of higher 
education admissions policies remain unresolved by the 
Supreme Court’s holdings in Grutter and Gratz. 189 Grutter
and Gratz did not answer the issue of whether public 
university’s may employ race-conscious remedies in order to 
186 See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants, Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supra note __ at 29 (“Because tests such as the SAT 
and the LSAT measure only a very narrow skill set and correlate poorly 
with even narrow measures of future performance, to propose any rigid 
use of them as tools for distributing opportunity, rather than as tools for 
diagnosing educational needs and designing pedagogical strategies is 
illegitimate.  Since these tests downgrade the performance of black and 
other minority students, the suggestion that they should be used in a rigid 
manner is outrageous–it is a knowing proposal for a racist double 
standard.”)
187 See supra text accompanying notes 99-117.
188 See supra text accompanying notes 115-118.
189 See Margaret Graham Tebo, New Frontier for Affirmative Action, 2 No. 
25 A.B.A.J. E-Report 3 (2003) (stating that while Grutter resolved the 
issue of whether diversity is a compelling government interest many of 
the questions in the affirmative action area remain unresolved).
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remedy past segregation.190  Also, the Supreme Court failed 
to address the Grutter and Gratz intervenors’ argument that 
a public university has an affirmative duty under the Equal 
Protection Clause to prevent resegregation that would result 
if the university relies primarily on standardized test scores 
and GPA as admissions criteria.191  The recent cases also did 
not address whether a race conscious admission policy may 
be justified to remedy ongoing de facto segregation in a 
state’s elementary and secondary school system.192  Because 
all of these issues remain to be resolved in the area of higher 
education admissions policy, minority students and public 
interest groups committed to the resolution of these 
lingering questions must consider alternatives to 
intervention.
Minority students and public interest groups 
advocating race-conscious admissions policies as one method 
of reversing systemic racial inequality should consider 
becoming plaintiffs in lawsuits against public universities to 
challenge current admissions policies.193  While these cases 
may ultimately prove unsuccessful on their merits the 
position as plaintiffs will afford a better opportunity to be 
heard than through the procedure of intervention.194
Similar to the litigation strategy adopted by Caucasian 
plaintiffs in the affirmative action cases, a minority student 
after being rejected from a state university would file suit 
against the university challenging its admissions policy.195
190 See Gratz II, supra note ___ at 12, n. 9 (stating that the Court affirmed 
the district court’s rejection of the intervenors’ argument that LSA’s race 
conscious admission program was justified by past discrimination, 
because the University failed to offer past discrimination as a justification 
for the program); [Bakke on past segregation]
191 See id.
192 See id;  Lawrence, supra note 107, at 946 (arguing that “subordinated minority 
children” becoming plaintiffs in a recent lawsuit places “the victims of racism at the 
center” of the admission debate).
193 See Rios v. Regents of the Univer. Of Cal., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1999) (lawsuit in 
which minority plaintiffs filed suit against the University of California at Berkeley’s 
admissions policies which relied on GPA and standardized test  scores);  Lawrence, 
supra note 107, at 943-46 (citing Rios as an example of litigants challenging “race-
neutral” admissions policies such as complete reliance on standardized test scores and 
GPA as the criteria for admissions).
194 See supra discussion in Part II regarding the failure of intervention to provide a 
meaningful opportunity for the minority student’s narrative to be heard.
195 See supra note 188.
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There is a growing movement among legal scholars 
and educators which questions the validity of standardized 
tests as a legitimate admissions criteria.196  Presumably the 
university’s admissions program would be primarily based 
on the use of standardized tests and GPAs to admit 
students.197  The rejected minority applicant would argue 
that the use of standardized testing and GPA as the 
predominant factor in admissions violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.198  The 
argument regarding the inappropriate use of the LSAT and 
GPA as admissions standards has already begun to be 
litigated.  Justice Thomas noted in his dissent in Grutter
that:
The Law School’s continued adherence to measures its 
knows produce racially skewed results is not entitled to 
deference . . .The Law School itself admits that the test is 
imperfect . . .An infinite variety of admissions methods are 
196 Richard Delgado, Official Elitism or Institutional Self-Interest? 10 
Reasons Why UC-Davis Should Abandon the LSAT (and Why Other Good 
Law Schools Should Follow Suit), 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 593, 594- 95 
(2001) (arguing that standardized testing is primarily a lucrative business 
for testing corporations instead of a measure for academic success); 
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Legal Fiction of Standardized Testing, 21 
LAW IN EQ. 397 (2003) (challenging the use of standardized tests through 
the narrative of minority students);   Lani Guinier & Susan Sturm, 
Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953, 965 (1996) (“In fact, 
the dominance of standardized tests in selection is a relatively recent 
development.  The civil rights revolution, and the introduction of 
affirmative action programs, occurred at the same time that society was 
formalizing a ‘meritocracy’ based on education and standardized 
testing.”); Lawrence, supra note 107, at 945 (arguing that the University 
of California at Berkeley’s admissions procedure rely on standardized 
tests in a “determinative and exclusionary way”);  Symposium 
Proceedings, Building a Multiracial Social Justice Movement, 27 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 23 (2001- 02) (citing Malcolm Gladwell, The 
Examined Life: What Stanley H. Kaplan Taught Us About the S.A.T., 
New Yorker, Dec. 17, 2001, at 86) (professor Gerald Torres noting that 
researcher have found that students who would have been rejected for 
admission if considering only GPA or standardized tests are 
outperforming expectations when admitted under admissions policies that 
do not consider standardized test scores).
197 See generally, Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2418-20 (describing LSA’s admissions 
procedure which used a student’s GPA and standardized test score to initially classify 
all applicants);  Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2331-32 (recounting the Law School’s 
admissions policy including the Law School’s use of LSAT and GPA as predictors of 
academic success).
198 See supra note 188.
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available to the Law School.  Considering all of the radical 
thinking that has occurred at this country’s universities, the 
Law Schools’ intractable approach toward admissions is 
striking.199
Also, if the university has an admissions policy, like 
that of the University of Michigan Law School, in which race 
is a consideration in admissions, the student could also seek 
a declaratory judgment that the university’s race conscious 
admissions program should be expanded.  The minority 
student should argue that race conscious admissions 
programs must be expanded in order to serve not just as a 
method of creating diversity in the school’s enrollment, but 
also as a method of remedying past discrimination and 
ongoing racial discrimination in the state education 
system.200
Some obvious barriers exist to the success of a lawsuit 
constructed under these legal theories.  First, in regards to 
the use of the LSAT and GPA as admissions criteria, while 
there may be a gap in LSAT scores and GPAs that correlates 
with race, these criteria on their face are race neutral.  Also, 
arguably the advent of the use of standardized tests and 
GPA as admissions criteria may not be able to be traced to a 
racially based motive.  Therefore, an Equal Protection 
challenge to these admissions criteria will likely be subject 
to rational basis review.201  Under rational basis review 
courts will ask only whether the university has a rational 
basis for employing standardized tests and GPA as 
199 Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. 2360-61.
200 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
201
 Plaintiffs in recent affirmative action cases have also claimed a cause of action 
under Title VI of the 1964 civil rights act.  See, e.g.,  Gratz III, 123 S.Ct. at 2417. The 
analysis of a Title VI violation is identical to analysis under the Equal Protection 
Clause.  See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2347 (citing Bakke, 483 U.S. at 287).  Prior to 
2001, under regulations promulgated under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
private plaintiffs could challenge governmental actions which had a disparate impact 
based on race, national origin, or ethnicity.  In 2001, the Supreme Court in Alexander 
v. Sandoval held that these disparate impact regulations may not be enforced through 
a private right of action.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).  
Therefore, potential minority student plaintiffs will likely not have a separate Title VI 
disparate impact challenge to facially neutral admissions criteria. But see William C. 
Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT creates “Built-In Headwinds”: An Educational 
and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 121, 173 (2002) 
(describing a viable disparate impact challenge to the use of standardized tests).
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admissions criteria.202  The university’s obvious justification 
will be that standardized tests and GPA are the best 
predictors for academic success, although not the only useful 
predictors.203  Rational basis review is generally easy to 
satisfy, therefore it is unlikely that a constitutional 
challenge to a university’s use of LSATs and GPA and 
admissions criteria would be successful.204  Also, the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Grutter makes it clear that 
university’s should be given deference to determine the 
admissions criteria that best allow the university to meet its 
institutional goals.205
A student seeking a declaratory judgment that a 
public university’s race-conscious admissions program is 
justified based on past discrimination will also face 
difficulties.  First, both the district courts in Grutter and 
Gratz, the Sixth Circuit in Grutter, and the Supreme Court 
in Gratz emphasized the reason for the race-conscious 
admissions policy given at the time the policy was 
adopted.206  Therefore, even if the minority plaintiff came 
forward with an alternative factual background for the 
adoption of the race-conscious admissions policy, it is 
unclear whether a court would require the university to 
publicly adopt a specific justification for the program.  
202 See Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (citing Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42) (stating that a facially race neutral policy 
with no discriminatory intent is subject to “rational basis” review); Robert 
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 
YALE. L. J. 1943, n.65 (2003) (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294, 303-304 (1964)(describing rational basis review);  James E. Ryan, 
The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation 
Cases, 81 Nor. Car. L. rev. 1659, 1694 (2003) (stating that a policy which 
is facially neutral, with no finding of discriminatory intent will be subject 
to rational basis review, which is typically simple to satisfy).
203 See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2332 (stating that Law School admissions officials 
must consider LSAT scores as admissions criteria, because they are “important (if 
imperfect) predictors of academic success in law school.”).
204 See supra note 197;  see Kidder & Rosner, supra note 197, at 173 (2002) (stating 
that an Equal Protection Clause challenge to the use of standardized tests is likely a 
dead end, but describing a viable disparate impact challenge to the use of 
standardized tests).
205 See Grutter V, 123 S.Ct. at 2339 (stating that the Court’s holding is in keeping
with the Court’s deference to a university’s academic decisions).
206 See supra notes 158-163.
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Therefore, the minority plaintiff would likely need to seek a 
declaratory judgment that the university should adopt a 
more expansive race-conscious policy then the policy already 
in place, in order to remedy the university’s past 
discrimination.  A model for this would be desegregation 
cases in which state’s were required by court order or 
administrative order to adopt affirmative measures to 
desegregate a school system.
The advantage to minority students and public 
interest organizations in abandoning intervention in favor of 
becoming plaintiffs is that as plaintiffs there are expansive 
rhetorical, narrative advantages.207  Despite the claim that 
in public law litigation, intervention provides a method for 
the protection of third party interests, the treatment by the 
courts of the intervenors in the recent affirmative action 
education cases demonstrates that may courts confronted 
with public law litigation continue to treat the litigation as a 
bi-polar enterprise.  The court allows the plaintiff and 
defendant the powerful narrative tool of shaping the 
framework of the litigation, both in evidence and legal 
arguments.  By becoming plaintiffs in litigation in lawsuits 
against university defendants, minority students would be 
able to assume this narrative highground.  The courts 
making decisions in these cases would be forced to confront 
and engage with the arguments put forth by minority 
students.  Even if ultimately unsuccessful in the litigation, 
arguably the minority students and public interest groups 
advocating further change in admissions programs would be 
practically no worse off than they are today, in the sense 
that although the university’s would still use LSAT and 
GPA as predominant admissions criteria, race conscious 
remedies would also remain in place.
Due to the obvious barriers to successful litigation 
regarding admissions criteria, and the use of race-conscious 
remedies to remedy past discrimination, other alternatives 
should be explored by minority students seeking to gain 
narrative highground.  One method that has proven to be 
successful for advocates interested in transforming 
207 See Lawrence, supra note 107, at 946-47 (arguing that minorities serving as 
plaintiffs in lawsuits against universities regarding admissions policies has strong
rhetorical value by giving voice to a different view of what constitutes equality and 
justice);  Kidder & Rosner, supra note 197, at 143 (suggesting a litigation strategy for 
minority students to challenge the use of standardized testing).
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admissions policies is the use of legislative alternatives.  In 
Texas, after the Hopwood decision that ended the use of 
traditional race-conscious admissions policies, minority 
legislators developed an alternative admissions program 
called the Texas Ten Percent Plan.208  The Texas Ten 
Percent Plan allows for students graduating in the top ten 
percent from a Texas high school would be automatically
admitted to any college or university in the state.209  The 
minority legislators also succeeded in revolutionizing the 
debate surrounding admissions criteria in general, by 
shifting the focus of the admissions policy away from 
standardized testing.210  Also, the adoption of the Texas Ten 
Percent Plan allowed the legislature to examine the state’s 
higher education system as a continuation of the state’s 
efforts to create equal quality education at the elementary 
and secondary school levels.211  These goals are similar to 
208 See Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, THE MINER'S CANARY 72 (2002) 
(recalling the coalition of minority legislators and their purposes in 
proposing the Texas Ten percent Plan);  Danielle Holley & Delia Spencer, 
Note, The Texas Ten Percent Plan, 34 Harv. C.R.-C.L. 245, 252-60 
(describing the legislative process of adopting the Texas Ten Percent 
Plan).  California and Florida also have percentage plans that use GPA, 
instead of standardized test scores as the primary criteria for college 
admissions.  See generally William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from 
Sweatt to Grutter:  A History of African American, Latino, and Native 
American Admissions: 1950-2000, 19 Harvard BlackLetter Law Journal 1, 
29-30 (2003) (detailing the California and Florida percentage plans);  
Douglass C. Lawrence, Note, Challenging Affirmative Action:  Does 
Diversity Justify Race-Conscious Admissions Programs?, 36 Suffolk U. L. 
Rev. 83 (2002) (describing California and Florida percentage plans).
209 See William E. Forbath & Gerald Torres, Merit and Diversity after 
Hopwood, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 185 (1999) (detailing criteria of Texas 
Ten Percent Plan); Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 245 (describing 
requirements of ten percent Plan).
210 See Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 260 (arguing that through the adoption 
of the Texas Ten Percent Plan the Texas legislature sought to redefine “merit” as 
separate from standardized test scores).
211 See Lawrence, supra note 104, at 969 (“By treating the top students at 
each of the state's schools as "most qualified," the University takes 
responsibility for existing discriminatory conditions in a state where most 
schools are still racially segregated and unequally financed, training 
future leaders from oppressed and under-served communities, and 
challenging the state to make its separate and unequal schools equal.”);  
Holley & Spencer, supra note 204, at 262 (stating that the Ten Percent 
Plan places emphasis on equalizing the quality of secondary school 
education because the state is further motivated by the need to prepare 
students for higher education);  but see Michelle Adams, Isn’t it Ironic: 
The Central Paradox at the Heart of Percentage Plans, 62 Ohio St. L. J. 
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the goals of the students and public interest groups that 
have become intervenors in the recent affirmative action 
education cases.
Furthermore, drafting and advocating legislation that 
would advocate less reliance on standardized testing as an 
admissions criteria, would serve as a direct narrative 
contrast to opponents of race-conscious remedies who have 
used ballot initiatives in California and Washington to end 
the use of race conscious remedies in those states.212 Also, 
legislative action specifically to acknowledge that the use 
race-conscious policies in admissions is justified by the 
state’s commitment to remedying past discrimination and 
ending ongoing segregation in secondary and elementary 
education echoes other recent movements by civil rights 
organizations, such as the racial reconciliation and 
reparations movement.
Conclusion
Through intervention, minority students and public 
interest groups have sought to preserve race-conscious 
admissions policies on their merits, but also to gain 
recognition for their unique narrative.  The minority 
students’ narrative which presents race-conscious 
admissions policies as a method of ending continuing racial 
inequality and offsetting the negative impact of admissions 
criteria such as the LSAT has remained at the margins in 
higher education affirmative action litigation.  In order for 
this narrative to gain narrative force, minority students 
must shift away from their procedural posture as 
intervenors towards becoming plaintiffs in litigation or 
proponents of legislation that revolutionizes higher 
education admissions criteria.
1729 (2001) (asserting that percentage plans diversify higher education 
through a continued reliance of segregated elementary and secondary 
schools).
212 See generally Lawrence, supra note 104, at 952-56 (recounting the California 
ballot initiative and organizing by minority students to repeal the anti-affirmative 
action amendment).
